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“Standing” Up for the Environment: The Ability of
Plaintiffs To Establish Legal Standing To Redress
Injuries Caused by Global Warming
I. INTRODUCTION
Corpses floating in the streets;1 citizens looting the city they had
once called home;2 people wading through inundated
neighborhoods, foraging “for the bare necessities of life.”3 Such grim
scenes one might expect to view on the nightly news—another
unfortunate account, perhaps, of the misery and disorder plaguing a
third-world country. Few hearts were prepared, however, to observe
these deplorable scenes occurring in their own country.
The source of this unprecedented disaster was Hurricane Katrina,
and it delivered to Gulf Coast residents an indelible lesson of why
many refer to such a hurricane as nothing less than a “monster.”4
Katrina’s pulverizing winds and towering storm surge toppled the
concrete floodwalls protecting the city of New Orleans, releasing “a

1. Hearing on Experiences and Challenges of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees Before the H.
Select Comm. on Katrina Response Investigation, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Ishmael
Muhammad), available at LEXIS, News Library; see also Rob Puentes Discusses the Poor and
Stranded in America (NPR radio broadcast Jan. 11, 2006) (transcript on file with LEXIS,
News Library).
2. Gallup Poll on Police Shows Why More Citizens Are Buying Guns, Says CCRKBA,
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 10, 2005, available at http://releases.usnewswire.com/
printing.asp?id=56575; see also Tim Padgett, Can New Orleans Do Better? After His Katrina
Performance, Mayor Ray Nagin Needs to Show He’s the One To Revive the City, TIME, Oct. 24,
2005, at 34.
3. David Ovalle et al., Region Awash in Heartbreak and Heroism, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2005, at A1.
4. Tom Vanden Brook & Larry Copeland, Hurricane Katrina: 160 MPH “Monster”—
New Orleans Residents Ordered Out as Storm Screams Towards Land, USA TODAY, Aug. 29,
2005, available at http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/USATODAY/2005/08/29/983049.
“The word ‘hurricane’ is derived from Hurican, the god of evil of the Carib people of the
Caribbean. Hurican was himself inspired by the Mayan god Hurakan, who destroyed humans
with great storms and floods.” Brian Handwerk, Eye on the Storm: Hurricane Katrina Fast
GEOGRAPHIC
NEWS,
Sept.
6,
2005,
available
at
Facts,
NAT’L
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0906_050906_katrina_facts.html.
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wall of water” that devastated the city and created “the costliest
storm in U.S. history.”5
In addition to its astronomical costs, Katrina ignited a storm of
speculation over the possible link between global warming and the
cause of the storm. Robert F. Kennedy Jr. blamed Katrina partly on
“President Bush’s reluctance to cap carbon-dioxide emissions.”6
Former Vice President Al Gore, speaking of lessons learned from
Katrina, stated that although terrorism is “extremely serious . . . on a
long-term global basis, global warming is the most serious problem
we’re facing.”7
Not everyone agrees, however, that there is a causal link between
global warming and natural disasters such as Katrina. According to
President George W. Bush, Katrina was not the consequence of “the
malice of evil men,” but rather “the fury of water and wind.”8 Dr.
William Gray, a pioneer in the science of hurricane forecasting, is
confident that Katrina was not caused by global warming and that
the impact of global warming on hurricanes is being “grossly
exaggerated.”9 The EPA admits that it is still uncertain about the
actual character of the risks associated with global warming.10

5. Joby Warrick & Michael Grunwald, Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design Flaws,
WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2005, at A1. Daniel Genter, a Louisiana native and president of RNC
Genter Capital, remarked that New Orleans “looks like a Third World country that has been
artillery shelled.” Tom Sullivan, Future of New Orleans Debt Remains Uncertain, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 13, 2006, at C3.
6. Patrick J. Michaels, The Global-Warming God: Must It Now Be Appeased?, NAT’L
REV., Oct. 10, 2005, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/
michaels200510050829.asp.
7. The “Oh, Really” Factor, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Nov. 15, 2005, at A16.
8. William Yardley & Michael Luo, As Recovery Slowly Starts, Some Lights Go On and
Some Mail Is Delivered, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 26.
9. James K. Glassman, Hurricanes and Global Warming: Interview with Meteorologist
Dr.
William
Gray,
CAPITALISM
MAG.,
Sept.
12,
2005,
available
at
http://capmag.com/article.asp?ID=4403. Dr. Gray “has worked in the observational and
theoretical aspects of tropical meteorological research for more than 40 years” and his
“hurricane forecast[s] [have] gained international attention, and won him the Neil Frank
Award of the National Hurricane Conference in 1995.” The Online Resource for the Tropical
Storm Forecaster, The Tropical Meteorology Project, http://tropical.atmos.colostate.edu (last
visited Mar. 1, 2006).
10. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GLOBAL WARMING, CLIMATE, UNCERTAINTIES,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/climateuncertainties.html
(last
visited Mar. 1, 2006). In upholding the EPA’s denial of a petition to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles, the D.C. Circuit Court noted findings of the National Research
Council that a “‘causal linkage’ between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming ‘cannot
be unequivocally established.’” Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
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The polemic regarding the actual consequences of global
warming is now moving from the political and scientific arenas into
the courtroom. In the aftermath of Katrina, a New Orleans firm filed
a complaint in federal court against oil companies, alleging that these
fossil-fuel based businesses constitute the “greatest single source” of
global warming and that these companies generated “conditions
whereby a storm of the strength and size of Hurricane Katrina would
inevitably form and strike the Mississippi Gulf Coast.”11 Some view
these suits as a necessary mechanism to redress injuries resulting from
negligent actions of oil companies; others believe that such attorneyled conflicts are merely “a sobering reminder of our litigation-crazed
society.”12
Regardless of the motivation underlying these claims, one
threshold consideration stands between the plaintiffs and any
favorable judgment: legal standing. It is “common understanding”
that in order for a federal court to assert jurisdiction over a particular
matter, the petitioner must prove that she has standing to sue.13 In
other words, the petitioner must prove to the court that her claim is
fit for its adjudication. Thus, before a judge can award a favorable
verdict to a plaintiff for a defendant’s contributions to global
warming, the plaintiff must first satisfy this “threshold jurisdictional
question.”14
This Comment argues that petitioners seeking redress for injuries
that they have suffered from a defendant’s contributions to global
warming cannot establish legal standing in a federal court. To
develop and support this conclusion, this Comment first argues that

(quoting NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME OF
THE KEY QUESTIONS 17 (2001)).
11. Ben Bain & Pattie Waldmeir, Lawyers Aim To Pin Blame for Katrina on Big
Business, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 22, 2005, at 4; see also Ne’er Sue Wells, INVESTOR’S BUS.
DAILY, Oct. 28, 2005, at A12; Hurricane Katrina: Class-Action Lawsuits Blame Oil
Companies for Global Warming, Wetland Damage, GREENWIRE, Oct. 20, 2005. The plaintiffs
in one lawsuit claim that “‘[d]espite warning from scientists . . . about the adverse effects of
their activities on the environment in general and global warming in particular,’ the oil
companies ‘have continued to engage in or increase the activities that have increased Global
Warming.’” Id.
12. Id. (quoting Dave Gardner, Spokesman, Exxon Mobil Corp., and defendant in one
of the global warming lawsuits).
13. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
14. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155
(1990)).
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plaintiffs will fail to satisfy the constitutional requirements of
standing on three different bases: (1) they will be unable to prove
that the global warming resulting from the defendant’s carbon
dioxide emissions is the likely cause of their injury; (2) where they
allege that the defendant’s actions will cause a future injury, they will
be unable to prove that the injury will occur imminently; and (3)
they will fail to prove that carbon dioxide emissions of a particular
entity caused their injuries. These conclusions stem from the current
uncertainty of the science regarding global warming―specifically,
the causal link between global warming and natural disasters, and the
speculative nature of the climate modeling underlying the science.
Second, this Comment argues that until the science becomes more
certain, the more probable way for plaintiffs to hold defendants
accountable in a court of law for their influence on global warming is
to claim a procedural rather than a substantive injury.15
Part II summarizes the facts of the two controlling cases on legal
standing in today’s legal environment—Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife16 and Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services17—and highlights the sections of the Court’s reasoning in
these cases that are most relevant to how a court should analyze legal
standing in global warming suits. Part III considers some global
warming basics and accents some of the salient points of contention
between proponents and opponents of global warming. Only a few
cases treating legal standing for global warming injuries have made
their way to federal courts, and the courts in those cases have yet to
conduct an exhaustive analysis of all the elements of legal standing.
For that reason, Part IV walks through each of the factors that
plaintiffs will have to satisfy to meet the standard for legal standing in
a federal court and evaluates the probability of proving these
elements in global warming cases. Part V discusses the nature of a
procedural injury and assesses how alleging such an injury would
facilitate plaintiffs’ access to a federal court for adjudication of their
global warming injuries. Part VI provides a hypothetical comparison
to show the difference in outcomes between alleging a substantive
15. The scope of this Comment is restricted to global warming plaintiffs’ ability to bring
their claims in federal courts. Certainly, plaintiffs may have the option of bringing some of
their claims (primarily their state common law claims) in state court, but that is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
16. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
17. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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injury versus a procedural injury. Part VII offers a concise
conclusion.
II. LEGAL STANDING
Although serious arguments may exist over the consequences of
global warming, what a petitioner must do to prove standing in a
federal court is, by contrast, less disputed. Legal standing refers to a
federal court’s duty to limit its jurisdiction to “actual cases or
controversies.”18 In other words, the court must assure that the
parties before it are genuinely adverse to each other and that they
both have “personal stake[s]” in the outcome of the case.19 The
court must make this initial determination before it can consider the
merits of the case.20
Standing has two components: constitutional standing and
prudential standing.21 Constitutional standing evolved from the
clause in Article III of the Constitution that limits the jurisdiction of
federal courts to cases and controversies.22 Plaintiffs must prove three
elements to satisfy constitutional standing: (1) they have suffered an
“injury in fact”; (2) their “injury in fact” was caused by the
defendant’s actions; and (3) their “injury in fact” will be redressed by
a favorable judgment from the court.23 However, even if a plaintiff
passes the constitutional standing requirement, the plaintiff may still
have to satisfy prudential standing, which consists of an additional
number of court-imposed limitations to assure that the particular
case or controversy is being brought by the proper party.24 Courts
18. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (“No principle is
more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the
constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” (citing
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968))).
19. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997). Standing is defined as “[a] party’s right
to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1413 (7th ed. 1999).
20. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1998).
21. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
22. Peter A. Alpert, Citizen Suits Under the Clean Air Act, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 283, 289 (1988).
23. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
24. Alpert, supra note 22, at 288. The Supreme Court recognizes the prudential
limitations of standing but treats the requirements of constitutional standing as the “core
component of standing.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. For this reason, this Comment will address
the requirements of prudential standing, but the focus of this Comment will be constitutional
standing.
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invoke prudential standing where the plaintiff lacks a clear statutory
right to bring his cause of action.25 This implies that the plaintiff may
still be denied legal standing―even if he has satisfied constitutional
standing―where he brings a common law claim or a statutory claim
under a statute that lacks a clear provision authorizing a suit
pursuant to its terms. Principal among these prudential limitations is
the requirement that the plaintiff’s injured interest falls within the
scope of interests Congress intended to protect in enacting the
statute pursuant to which the plaintiff files her claim.26
To provide context for the analysis of how the courts could apply
current case law to determine standing for plaintiffs in global
warming suits, this Part will review the foundational cases from
which the current standing law in the circuits has evolved. Although
many cases have contributed to the current law of standing,27 this
Part will focus on Lujan and Laidlaw because these are the two
principal cases that every circuit relies upon when articulating the
standard for proving legal standing.28

25. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 252 (1998).
26. Fed. Election Comm. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998).
27. See generally Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 83 (1998);
Bennett v. Spear 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889
(1990); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669
(1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 728 (1972); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
28. See generally Grassroots Recycling Network, Inc. v. EPA, 429 F.3d 1109, 1111–12
(D.C. Cir. 2005); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2005); Barnes v.
Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2005); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.,
399 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2005); O’Sullivan v. Chicago, 396 F.3d 843, 854 (7th Cir.
2005); Mulder v. Lundberg, 154 F.App’x. 52, 54 (10th Cir. 2005); N.Y. Coastal P’ship, Inc.
v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 341 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 2003); BCCA Appeal Group v. EPA,
355 F.3d 817, 825 (5th Cir. 2003); Eddings v. Hot Springs, 323 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir.
2003); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 863 (9th Cir. 2003); Friends for Ferrell
Parkway v. Stasko, 282 F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2002); Koziara v. Casselberry, 392 F.3d 1302,
1304 (11th Cir. 2004). The standard articulated in Lujan—injury in fact, causation, and
redressability—and subsequently followed in Laidlaw refers to the requirements of
constitutional standing. As previously mentioned, another aspect of legal standing is prudential
standing. However, the Court in Lujan and Laidlaw did not find there to be a prudential
standing issue, probably because the plaintiffs were clearly authorized to bring suit under the
citizen suit provisions of the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act. Prudential
standing will be discussed later in this Comment. See infra Part IV.D.
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A. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

In Lujan, the United States Supreme Court held that the
plaintiffs lacked legal standing to challenge a regulation enacted by
the government pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires that a federal agency “insure that
any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency” does
not threaten any endangered species.29 In 1978, the Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service issued a
regulation on behalf of the Secretary of Interior and the Secretary of
Commerce, which required federal agencies to abide by section
7(a)(2)’s provisions for actions taken domestically as well as
overseas.30 Eight years later, the Department of the Interior revised
the regulation to narrow the scope of section 7(a)(2) to apply only
to “actions taken in the Untied States or on the high seas.”31 In
response, Defenders of Wildlife filed an action seeking to have the
Secretary of Interior restore the initial regulation, making section
7(a)(2)’s requirements equally applicable to domestic and foreign
actions.32
The Court did not determine the merits of Defenders’ action
because the Court held that it had failed to prove standing to
challenge the regulation.33 Defenders relied on the injuries that
would allegedly be sustained by two of its members34 if certain
federal overseas projects were not constrained by the consultative
procedures of the ESA.35 One member had previously traveled to
Egypt where she had “observed the traditional habitat of the
endangered Nile crocodile.”36 She intended to return to view the
crocodile directly and claimed that she would suffer harm from
federal participation in a project that would endanger the animal’s
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
30. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558 (1992).
31. Id. at 558–59.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 562.
34. An organization may bring a lawsuit on behalf of its members if three requirements
are met: first, the individual members could prove standing if they were acting in their own
capacity as plaintiff; second, the interests implicated by the action are consistent with the
objectives of the organization; and third, the suit does not require any involvement of the
individual members. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181
(2000) (quoting Hut v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
35. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563.
36. Id.
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habitat.37 Another member had previously visited Sri Lanka where
she had examined the habitat of “endangered species such as the
Asian elephant and the leopard.”38 She alleged that she would suffer
harm from federal participation in a project that potentially
threatened these species’ habitats, which she intended to visit again.39
In evaluating these members’ standing, the Court articulated a
standard that has become the touchstone for legal standing. Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that a long history of case law
had established “the irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing”:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be
“fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not . . . the result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed
to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a
favorable decision.”40

The Court’s rationale for denying standing centered on the
members’ failure to demonstrate that they would sustain an
“imminent injury.”41 One factor that led the Court to this
conclusion was its inability to see how damage to a species so remote
in location from the two members would cause them imminent
injury.42 This finding was bolstered by the members’ lack of
“concrete plans” to return to the actual locations in the near
future.43 The Court concluded that the members’ professed intent to
return “some day” was too open-ended to show that their alleged
injuries were “certainly impending.”44
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 560–61 (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 564.
42. Id. Showing an “actual” injury was not relevant here because the plaintiffs were not
alleging that they already suffered injury due to the foreign projects but that they would suffer
injury in the future when they returned to Egypt and Sri Lanka to view the animals.
43. Id.
44. Id. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, implied that if the
two organization members in this case had already purchased plane tickets to visit Egypt and
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The Court’s view of geographic remoteness as an impediment to
proving imminent injury was reflected in the Court’s rejection of
three different “novel” nexus theories of standing proposed by the
plaintiffs.45 For example, the “‘animal nexus’” theory would allow a
person living in San Diego, who had a great love for observing the
behavior of gorillas, to have standing to sue a party for the harm it
does to gorillas in Congo.46 According to the Court, such theories
are “beyond all reason.”47 Apparently, the Court contemplated that a
more reasonable geographic proximity to the allegedly harmful
actions would provide better support to a likelihood of sustaining
imminent injury.
The Court’s second basis for denying standing was the
plaintiffs’ failure to show that a decision in their favor would redress
their alleged injuries.48 The Court doubted whether requiring the
Secretary of Interior to promulgate a new regulation would redress
their injuries.49 First, the Court determined that a favorable
judgment would not obligate the federal agencies funding the
alleged harmful projects to comply with the Secretary’s action.50
Second, even if the agencies were required to comply with the new
regulation, the contribution of the agencies to the allegedly harmful
projects was so minimal that the projects would continue operating
with or without them.51

Sri Lanka, or at least had a determined date that they could tell the court that they would
return to Egypt and Sri Lanka, then they may have satisfactorily proven that they would suffer
immediate injury. Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 565–67 (majority opinion).
46. See id. at 566. One of the other theories—the “ecosystem nexus” theory—
“propose[d] that any person who uses any part of a ‘contiguous ecosystem’ adversely affected
by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is located a great distance away.” Id. at
565. The other approach—the “vocation nexus” theory—posited that “anyone with a
professional interest in such animals can sue.” Id. at 566. It is unnecessary to treat all three of
the theories in the text of the Comment because the Court’s rejection of them is based on the
same rationale, namely the attenuated connection of the challenged conduct and the injury
caused by the geographic distance.
47. Id. Justice Scalia “categorically reject[ed]” the dissent’s position that the plaintiffs’
distance from the alleged harm was irrelevant. Id. at 567 n.3.
48. Id. at 568. The Court recognized the elements of causation and prudential
limitations but did not apply an analysis of these factors to its opinion.
49. Id. at 568–69.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 571. For example, AID, an agency involved in one of the challenged foreign
projects, contributed less than ten percent of the financing to the project. Id.

423

3BERTAGNA.FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/12/2006 10:51:07 AM

[2006

B. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
In Laidlaw, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had legal
standing to challenge the defendant’s violations of a permit issued
pursuant to the Clean Water Act (CWA).52 The defendant, a
hazardous waste facility, possessed a permit pursuant to the CWA53
to discharge treated water into a river.54 The facility had breached its
permit limits nearly five hundred times over an eight-year period.55
Friends of the Earth (FOE) filed a suit for the defendant’s permit
violations.56 To support standing, FOE relied on the alleged injuries
sustained by some of its members as a result of the permit
violations.57 For example, one member claimed that he lived a halfmile from the facility and the river, and that the river “looked and
smelled polluted.”58 He claimed that he would have liked to engage
in recreational activities in and around the river, such as swimming,
but his concern about the pollution of the water prevented him from
doing so.59
The Court was persuaded by such claims and held that FOE had
legal standing to bring its cause of action. The Court based its
holding on the same standing standard articulated in Lujan.60 Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the majority, concluded that the plaintiffs had
shown that they had suffered an injury-in-fact from the pollutant
discharges.61 The Court found that the evidence clearly

52. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 167 (2000).
53. 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251–1387 (2000).
54. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 175–76. The permit was issued under the Clean Water Act or
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which allowed the defendant to discharge pollutants into
the river as long as it did so within the limits set by the permit. Id. at 174. Mercury was the
primary pollutant and subject of this case. Id. at 176.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 177.
57. Id. at 181–83.
58. Id. at 181.
59. See id. at 181–82. Another member alleged a similar complaint, stating that she lived
two miles from the source of the pollution, which is where she had previously performed many
recreational activities, such as birdwatching and walking; however, her concern for her health,
due to the pollution, caused her to stop performing such activities. Id. at 182.
60. Id. at 180–81; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992).
61. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183–85. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented
and accused the Court of analyzing the question of injury to the plaintiffs in “the most casual
fashion,” making a “sham” out of the injury-in-fact requirement. Id. at 201 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). He relied on the lower court’s finding that the discharges did not actually injure
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demonstrated that the defendant had discharged pollutants in
violation of its permit and that those violations “directly affected”
the members’ “recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests.”62
Unlike Lujan, where the plaintiffs’ allegations required the Court to
speculate as to when their alleged injuries would occur, here the
Court could conclude with certainty that FOE’s members had
sustained actual, concrete injuries from the defendant’s conduct.
The Court additionally held that FOE possessed standing
because a favorable decision from the Court would provide them
redress.63 The defendant argued that “[c]ivil penalties offer no
redress to private plaintiffs . . . because they are paid to the
government,” not to the individual plaintiffs.64 The Court disagreed
and held that civil penalties can afford redress because they
discourage wrongdoers from committing the same offense again.65
The Court broadly held that any “sanction that effectively abates” a
particular conduct “and prevents its recurrence provides a form of
redress.”66
C.

Lujan and Laidlaw: A Comparison

When determining plaintiffs’ legal standing to sue, federal courts
are typically unflagging in introducing their analysis by citing to
Lujan or Laidlaw.67 These two cases form an essential backdrop to
evaluating how federal courts should determine standing in global
warming cases. It is particularly important to understand that the
the environment. Id. at 201. Justice Scalia allows for the possibility that plaintiffs, such as the
ones in this case, could allege an injury to their recreational and aesthetic interests if they were
more substantive. Id. at 200. For example, where one affiant had alleged that she was injured
because she could not go to the river anymore, but she had only visited the river twice in the
previous twenty years, her claim did not rise to the level of an injury-in-fact. Id. Scalia
characterized such claims as “vague, contradictory, and unsubstantiated allegations of
‘concern’ about the environment.” Id. at 201.
62. Id. at 183–84 (majority opinion). The claims in Laidlaw were not to “be equated
with the speculative ‘some day’ intentions to visit endangered species halfway around the
world.” Id.
63. Id. at 185–86.
64. Id. at 185.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 185–86. Justice Scalia found the Court’s treatment of redressability to be just
as “cavalier” as its treatment of injury-in-fact. Id. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He emphasized
that the purpose of “remediation” is to extend “relief specifically tailored to the plaintiff’s
injury, and not any sort of relief that has some incidental benefit to the plaintiff.” Id. at 204.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28.
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holdings of these two cases are entirely consistent with each other;
and given the facts, it should be no surprise that the Court came out
differently in the two cases.68
It is no surprise that the Court found injury-in-fact in one case
and not in the other. In Lujan, the plaintiffs claimed that they would
suffer injury because federal agencies’ contributions to a project
located in a third-world country almost 9000 miles away might cause
harm to an animal that they might like to see in the undetermined
future.69 In Laidlaw, the plaintiffs claimed that they had already
suffered injury from a facility’s discharge of a powerful toxin into a
river only a few miles away from their homes.70
Making this distinction between these two holdings is relevant to
global warming cases. In Lujan, it was not the geographic proximity
per se that precluded the Court from granting standing, but rather
the Court’s determination that the substantial distance between the
affected animals and the plaintiffs precluded proof of “certainly
impending” injuries.71 The Court acknowledged that a person who
works or observes an animal everyday may be able to prove imminent
injury, because it is likely that the individual would be planning on
viewing the animal shortly after its death, which was caused by the
federal project. The court need not speculate as to whether or not
the individual will be injured in the imminent future. However, in
the case of the individual who lives 9000 miles away from the animal,
the court must speculate as to how soon the individual will suffer
injury from the animal’s death. For this reason, the Court in Laidlaw
had no difficulty finding that FOE members’ injury was imminent,
given that they lived only a few miles from the polluted river and
could be injured by contact with the river, or lack of contact, on any
given day.
The foregoing comparison between Lujan and Laidlaw applies
to global warming suits because an obstacle that plaintiffs face is
proving that an injury from a defendant’s carbon dioxide emissions,
and ultimately global warming, is certainly impending. This
Comment argues, however, that the current state of science and the
68. Clearly, the dissenters in these two cases would not agree with the consistency of
these two decisions, but this is the author’s own interpretation.
69. Distance Calculator Between Cities, http://www.mapcrow.info (last visited Mar. 1,
2006) (verifying the distance between the United States and Sri Lanka to be over 9000 miles).
70. 528 U.S. at 176 (describing mercury as “an extremely toxic pollutant”).
71. 504 U.S. at 565 n.3.
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climate modeling used to predict the future impact of global
warming are speculative and contested. Consequently, plaintiffs are
unable to prove imminent injury in global warming suits. Global
warming plaintiffs are in a position similar to that of the Lujan
plaintiffs, having claims of imminent injury that amount to nothing
more than uncertain, ‘some day’ intentions.
In addition, it is no surprise that the Court found redressability
satisfied in Laidlaw and not in Lujan. In Lujan, even if the agencies
were completely enjoined from contributing to the foreign projects,
these projects would have continued uninterrupted with their normal
operations. In Laidlaw, civil penalties would have provided a
deterrent to future violations of the permit and endangerment to the
environment.
These two decisions demonstrate how redressability should be
applied in global warming cases. If plaintiffs can show injury-in-fact
and causation, a favorable judgment by the court will provide
redress. For example, if they can prove that a defendant’s emissions
caused a hurricane that damaged their property, legal damages would
redress their loss. If they can show that the emissions will cause a
hurricane in the imminent future that will injure their property, civil
penalties or injunctive relief will deter the defendants from
continuing to produce emissions at their current rate, mitigating the
influence of global warming and possibly decreasing the chances of
future destruction to their property.
III. GLOBAL WARMING
Global warming, a result of the greenhouse effect, “has become
the overriding environmental concern since the 1990s.”72 The
driving force of the greenhouse effect is the greenhouse gases—
carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone.73
The earth absorbs incoming solar radiation in order to fuel its
various needs.74 To prevent overheating, the earth radiates this
energy back into space, but greenhouse gases trap a substantial
72. BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL
STATE OF THE WORLD 258 (2001). Worldwatch Institute has stated that during this century
“the climate battle may assume the kind of strategic importance that wars—both hot and
cold—have had during” the prior century. Id.
73. Id. at 259.
74. LYDIA DOTTO, STORM WARNING: GAMBLING WITH THE CLIMATE OF OUR PLANET
31 (1999).
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portion of the heat before it entirely dissipates into space, keeping
the earth warm.75
As one expert explained, this natural phenomenon is the
“ultimate good news/bad news story.”76 On one hand, if it were not
for the greenhouse effect, “the average temperature on the Earth
would be approximately 33°C (59°F) colder and it is unlikely that
life as we know it would be able to exist.”77 The bad news—at least
to some scientists and an ever-increasing portion of the population—
is the “anthropogenic greenhouse effect,” or the extra warming to
the earth produced by human activities.78 Since pre-industrial times,
the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has risen by thirty
percent.79
The extent of human contributions to global warming, however,
remains a hotly-contested issue within the scientific and political
communities.80 The words penned by Shakespeare in The Merchant
of Venice seem particularly poignant to this conflict: “The devil can
cite Scripture for his purpose.”81 This is not to say that either side of
the global warming debate has a more morally-grounded, logically
sound, or scientifically correct position. Rather, both parties possess
an abundance of credible, provocative, and persuasive data to
corroborate their respective positions on the issue.
The result of all this conflicting research is a pervasive incertitude
within the scientific community with respect to the effects of global
warming, which creates an obstacle for courts. According to the
standard articulated in Lujan, a court is required to determine
whether the defendant’s contributions to global warming have
inflicted or will inflict an injury to a concrete, particularized interest

75. Id. at 32.
76. Id. at 31.
77. LOMBORG, supra note 72, at 260.
78. Id.
79. MARK MASLING, GLOBAL WARMING: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 10 (2004).
About fifty-five percent of the carbon dioxide that is released into the atmosphere is absorbed
again by the environment, but the remaining forty-five percent is added to the atmosphere.
LOMBORG, supra note 72, at 260.
80. See, e.g., PATRICK J. MICHAELS, MELTDOWN: THE PREDICTABLE DISTORTION OF
GLOBAL WARMING BY SCIENTISTS, POLITICIANS, AND THE MEDIA 22 (2004). But see ROSS
GELBSPAN, BOILING POINT: HOW POLITICIANS, BIG OIL AND COAL, JOURNALISTS, AND
ACTIVISTS HAVE FUELED THE CLIMATE CRISIS—AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO AVERT
DISASTER 19–20 (2004).
81. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 2.
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of the plaintiff and that the injury has occurred or will occur
imminently. However, the conflicting science impedes courts from
making that determination. If the scientists and academics cannot
arrive at a consensus regarding the actual consequences of global
warming, how can a court of law conclude that the defendant’s
emissions, which contribute to global warming, inflict an injury-infact on the plaintiff or that the injury will occur imminently? It
cannot, for the science fails to furnish the courts with the reasonable
level of certainty required by the law. In order to illustrate the nature
of this uncertainty, this Part presents three areas in which the parties
to this debate disagree: (1) the validity of the findings of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); (2) the link
between global warming and melting ice; and (3) the link between
global warming and hurricanes.
A.

The Proponents

1. IPCC
Adherents to the position supporting the dangers of global
warming attribute substantial credence to the findings and the
assessments of the IPCC.82 In its 1995 report, the IPCC concluded
that “evidence suggests a discernible human influence on the global
climate.”83 Its 2001 report stated that “[t]here is new and stronger
evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is
attributable to human activities.”84 Its 2001 report has been
characterized “as the most comprehensive study on the subject to
date,” and the head of the U.N. Environment Program stated that

82. The IPCC was established in 1988 in order “to assess on a comprehensive,
objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic information
relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its
potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation.” See IPCC Home, About IPCC,
www.ipcc.ch/about/about.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
83. Andrew Revkin, Ideas & Trends; All That Hot Air Must Be Having an Effect, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, § 4, at 5. The 1995 assessment predicted that “Earth’s average
temperature could rise by as much as 10.4 degrees over the next 100 years.” Philip P. Pan,
Scientists Issue Dire Prediction on Warming; Faster Climate Shift Portends Global Calamity This
Century, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2001, at A1.
84. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT 5 (2001), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/un/syreng/spm.pdf.
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the report’s findings “should sound alarm bells in every national
capital and in every local community.”85
2. Melting ice
Some see the dangers of global warming manifest in the
increasing amount of ice melting across the world. In 1980, a large
ice sheet in the Arctic called the Ward Hunt Ice Shelf was 150 feet
thick, but by 2003, it had dwindled down to less than half of that
measurement.86 NASA has determined that the ice overlaying the
Arctic Ocean is disappearing “at an astonishing rate”—about nine
percent every decade.87 Some scientists believe that within the next
twenty years, the ice cap on Kenya’s Mount Kilimanjaro will
completely melt.88
3. Hurricanes
The recent string of hurricanes has led some to attribute the
cause of these powerful forces of nature to global warming. The
2005 hurricane season “was the worst since recordkeeping began
151 years ago.”89 Dr. Greg Holland of the National Center on
Atmospheric Research has recently said that although global
warming may not be linked to an increase in the number of
hurricanes, it is linked to more intense hurricanes.90 Dr. Kerry
Emanuel of MIT recently published a study finding that “the
intensity of storms has essentially doubled in the past 30 years.”91
B.

The Opponents

1. IPCC
Global warming skeptics, however, question the reliability of the
IPCC’s conclusions. One study determined that only one-third of
the more than 200 “lead authors” of the assessments are actually
85. Pan, supra note 83, at A1.
86. GELBSPAN, supra note 80, at 19–20.
87. Id. at 21.
88. Id. at 22.
89. Valerie Bauerlein, Hurricane Debate Shatters Civility of Weather Science, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 2, 2006, at A1.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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climate scientists.92 Some researchers believe that the analysis upon
which the IPCC’s reports rely, which demonstrates that the earth’s
last one hundred years have been substantially hotter than past
centuries, is replete with “collation errors, unjustifiable truncation or
extrapolation of source data, [and] obsolete data,”93 and fails “to
support that the late twentieth-century climate is unusually warm.”94
Richard Lindzen, MIT professor and coauthor of the IPCC’s 1995
report, criticizes the Summary for Policymakers, a twenty-page
summary of a nearly 3000 page report from which most cite, saying
that “[t]he summary is written by 14 of the hundreds of scientists
that contributed. Is that a consensus? I don’t think so.”95
2. Melting ice
Some scientists believe that the world’s melting ice is not a result
of the reported recent warmer temperatures and that these
temperatures are not unusual when considered in the context of the
last century of the earth’s history.96 Some climatologists believe that
precipitation is the cause of Mount Kilimanjaro’s vanishing ice—not
rising temperatures.97 Scientists have noted that Africa actually had a
much warmer climate 4000 to 11,000 years ago than it has today,
“yet Kilimanjaro was much more glaciated because it was also wetter
than it is today.”98 One scientist determined that since 1940,
temperatures in the Arctic have been declining.99

92. MICHAELS, supra note 80, at 22. They concluded that “the ‘consensus’ that these
documents achieve is in fact determined by a majority opinion that is not necessarily formally
trained in the subject matter.” Id.
93. Editorial, Kyoto’s Dead Hand, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2005, at A10.
94. Ross McKitrick, Hockey Stick: Climate Is Not Unusually Warm, WALL ST. J., Dec.
23, 2005, at A15.
95. Fred Guterl, The Truth About Global Warming, NEWSWEEK, July 23, 2001, at 44
(quoting Richard Lindzen). Richard Lindzen wrote that the IPCC’s 1995 assessment “takes
great pains to point out that the statement has no implications for the magnitude of the effect,
is dependent on the [dubious] assumption that natural variability obtained from [computer]
models is the same as that in nature, and, even with these caveats, is largely a subjective
matter.” Id.
96. MICHAELS, supra note 80, at 43.
97. See id. at 36.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 45.
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3. Hurricanes
Dr. William Gray disagrees with the alleged causal link between
global warming and hurricanes. In recent testimony before
Congress, Dr. Gray stated his belief that human influence has not
caused the recent rash of intense hurricanes.100 He “believes the
current era of high activity will eventually end as a result of changes
in salinity and currents in the Atlantic.”101 Dr. Patrick J. Michaels
says that the storm trend that the Atlantic experienced last year was
similar to storm activity in the 1940s and 1950s, which was followed
by a period of weaker hurricanes.102 In sum, “there has been no
trend in hurricane intensity.”103
C.

Conclusion

The global warming discussion is similarly schismatic regarding
the link between global warming and other natural events, such as
floods, fires, and disease.104 The objective of this Comment is not to
declare which of these two parties is correct. The purpose of this

100. Bauerlein, supra note 89, at A1. A climatologist from the Georgia Institute of
Technology in Atlanta disagrees with Dr. Gray’s research and accuses of him having what she
calls “brain fossilization.” Id.
101. Id.
102. Michaels, supra note 6. Dr. Michaels teaches environmental science at the
University of Virginia, “is one of the most popular lecturers in the nation on the subject of
global warming,” and is a contributing author and reviewer of the IPCC. See Cato Institute,
Patrick J. Michaels, http://www.cato.org/people/michaels.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
103. Michaels, supra note 6.
104. The three disputed points with respect to global warming represent a mere sampling
of the range of matters upon which the different sides of the global warming debate disagree.
See generally Fred Pearce, Drought Bumps Up Global Thermostat, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 4,
2005 (arguing recent forest fires and droughts were caused by global warming); Report: Global
Warming To Bring Farming Woes, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 28, 2000 (arguing that global
warming leads to increased pests and injury to agriculture); Nancy Shute, The Weather Turns
Wild: Global Warming Could Cause Droughts, Disease, and Political Upheaval, U.S. NEWS,
Feb. 5, 2001, at 44 (arguing that global warming results in floods, disease, forest fires, and
rising sea levels). But see Thomas H. Maugh II, The Flip Side of Global Warming Agriculture:
An EPA-Commissioned Study Says the Greenhouse Effect Would Actually Boost Overall Farm
Production in the U.S., L.A. TIMES, May 17, 1990 (arguing that global warming may produce
greater crop yields); MICHAELS, supra note 80, at 142–46 (arguing that global warming has
not resulted in increased forest fires); S. Fred Singer, Global-Warming Theory Steams Ahead
Despite Conflicting Evidence, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Feb. 26, 2001, at 46 (arguing that
global warming has not resulted in warmer temperatures); S. Fred Singer, The Sky Isn’t Falling,
and the Ocean Isn’t Rising, WALL ST. J. (Brussels), Nov. 11, 1997, at 10 (arguing that global
warming is not resulting in rising sea levels).
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Comment, rather, is to show that it is safe to say that the science is
not settled on this issue, which poses a substantial obstacle to
plaintiffs attempting to prove legal standing in a federal court in
order to receive redress for the injuries that they allege are caused by
global warming—an obstacle that Lujan, Laidlaw, and subsequent
case law will not accommodate.
IV. LEGAL STANDING, GLOBAL WARMING,
AND SUBSTANTIVE INJURY
An understanding of the present state of global warming science
is important because this science will overlay a court’s analysis as to
whether plaintiffs are entitled to a federal court’s resolution of their
claim. Global warming plaintiffs will be attempting to prove
constitutional and prudential standing for claims of substantive injury
brought pursuant to either a federal statute105 or under the common
law.106 A substantive injury is distinguished from procedural injury in
that the latter results solely from a government entity’s failure to
comply with requisite procedures, and the former does not.107
Presently, the principal statute under which plaintiffs have alleged
substantive injury from global warming is the Clean Air Act
(CAA),108 and the primary common law theory under which plaintiffs
have sought redress is public nuisance.109 Regardless of whether the
105. Many major environmental statutes contain citizen suit provisions that authorize
private parties to stand in the shoes of the government to sue “when it is unable or unwilling
to take action.” Cox v. Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 291 n.18 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000); Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000).
106. A nuisance theory of recovery “lends itself naturally to combating the harms created
by environmental problems.” Cox, 256 F.3d at 291. For plaintiffs to bring a nuisance action
against a party, diversity of citizenship must exist in order for a federal court to have
jurisdiction. Frey v. EPA, 270 F.3d 1129, 1136–37 (7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, plaintiffs will
not be able to bring a nuisance action against the EPA or a different federal government
agency. Id.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 216–28.
108. Massachusetts v. EPA., 415 F.3d 50, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
109. See generally Korsinsky v. EPA, No. 05 Civ. 859, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21778
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2005); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02–4106 JSW, 2005
WL 2035596, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005). The reason plaintiffs would prefer to seek
relief under a common law theory rather than a citizen suit provision is that citizen suit
provisions allow private parties to act as “private attorneys general,” which generally restricts
the remedies that they can seek to injunctions and civil penalties. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v.
Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 336–37 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that the Clean Water Act does not
authorize private plaintiffs to recover monetary relief). Global warming plaintiffs may certainly
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legal basis for the plaintiffs’ injuries is a statutory or a common law
theory, plaintiffs must still prove legal standing to adjudicate their
claims in a federal court.110
This Part argues that given the framework of Lujan and Laidlaw,
plaintiffs will fail to prove constitutional standing on two different
fronts. First, they will fail to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
because they cannot conclusively demonstrate that the global
warming produced by the defendant’s carbon dioxide emissions
creates an actual injury, and they cannot prove that a future injury
from such emissions will be imminent. Second, plaintiffs will fail to
prove causation because the current state of science does not afford a
court the ability to trace the alleged injury to a particular defendant’s
emissions with the requisite level of certainty.
A. Injury-in-Fact
Global warming has the potential to impact a large segment of
the human population, and for that reason, the injury-in-fact
requirement seeks to assure courts that the petitioner has an interest
distinct from the larger general population.111 This prong of the
analysis seeks to save the courts from needlessly consuming their
resources adjudicating the claims of every “roving environmental
ombudsman” who wants to right all the alleged wrongs perpetrated
by global warming.112
Applying the Lujan standard to global warming cases, the first
component of constitutional standing—injury-in-fact—requires the
plaintiff to prove two aspects of her injury: the nature of her injury
and the timing of her injury. With respect to the nature of the injury,

receive redress by halting ongoing violations that may harm them if continued or by providing
deterrent measures through the imposition of civil penalties, but plaintiffs generally will not be
able to seek monetary relief for their injuries pursuant to a citizen suit provision in a federal
statute. Congress has made it clear that both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act
“expressly exclude damage actions.” Torres Maysonet v. Drillex, 229 F. Supp. 2d 105, 108–09
(D.P.R. 2002) (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 33104 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie)); see also
Green Hills, L.L.C. v. Aaron Streit, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 81, 85 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding
that the citizen suit provision of the RCRA provides injunctive relief but not legal damages).
110. See, e.g., Korsinsky, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21778 at *6–7; Cox, 256 F.3d at 305–
08 (showing that a petitioner must still prove standing to bring a nuisance claim); NAACP v.
Acusport Corp., 210 F.R.D. 446, 459–61 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
111. See Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156 (4th
Cir. 2000).
112. Id. at 157.
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she must allege an injury that is both “concrete” and
“particularized.”113 With respect to the timing of the injury, she must
allege an injury that is either “actual” (an injury that she has already
sustained) or an injury that will occur in the “imminent” future.114
This Part respectively analyzes four components of the injury-in-fact
analysis: (1) concrete injury; (2) particularized injury; (3) actual
injury; and (4) imminent injury. This Part argues that global
warming plaintiffs will have little trouble demonstrating a concrete,
particularized injury. However, they will fail to prove that they have
suffered an actual or imminent injury from a defendant’s carbon
emissions because current science precludes them from proving that
global warming has caused or will cause their injury, and that their
injury will be suffered imminently.
1. Concrete injury
Plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate a concrete injury.
Consistent with the standard enunciated in Lujan, a court will grant
standing to a global warming plaintiff only if that plaintiff alleges
injury to a concrete interest.115 A concrete interest can consist of an
economic, recreational, or aesthetic interest of the plaintiff.116 Thus,
in addition to alleging harm to something that is of a pecuniary
value, a plaintiff may allege that he “uses, or would use more
frequently, an area affected by the alleged[ly]” harmful emissions of
an entity and “that [her] aesthetic or recreational interests in the area
have been harmed.”117

113. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992).
114. Id.
115. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 2004).
116. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000). It even
appears that some courts consider a spiritual interest a concrete interest. In Defenders of
Wildlife v. Enviromental Protection Agency, the plaintiffs liked to watch and take pictures of
different animal species, as well as hike and camp in their habitats. 420 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir.
2005). The Ninth Circuit determined that they had a sufficient concrete interest because their
activities in those habitats brought them “recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual fulfillment,” and
the EPA’s failure to abide by the provisions of the Endangered Species Act threatened those
interests. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Sierra Club v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 430 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 2005); see also
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184; Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, No. 05-5032, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
1019, at *10–11 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2006); Tex. Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v.
EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 972 (7th Cir. 2005); Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th Cir.
2004); NRA of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 293 (6th Cir. 1997).
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Residents of the Gulf Coast suffered tremendous losses as a result
of Hurricane Katrina. A New Orleans resident who lost her home to
the hurricane has suffered an economic injury. A resident who claims
he can no longer enjoy boating or hunting along the Mississippi
River has suffered a recreational injury.118 A resident (or even a
tourist) of New Orleans who cannot fully appreciate the French
Quarter or New Orleans’s wildlife preserves has suffered an aesthetic
injury.119 The requirement of showing an injury to a concrete interest
will not prove to be a substantial obstacle to global warming
plaintiffs.
2. Particularized injury
Global warming plaintiffs will be able to satisfy a court that they
have suffered a particularized injury. Lujan requires that the injury
not only be concrete but also particularized. In other words, the
plaintiff must show that a company or federal agency’s contributions
to global warming impacted upon her “in a personal and individual
way.”120 This requirement bars “those with merely generalized
grievances from bringing suit to vindicate an interest common to the
entire public.”121 For example, a resident of Alaska who loves polar
bears, works with them extensively, and observes them frequently in
the zoo, might claim that global warming has caused the sea levels to
rise in the Arctic, endangering polar bears.122 She may claim that she
has sustained a particularized injury to her aesthetic interest in
observing polar bears in safe, healthy surroundings.123 Since she
could claim that she had directly observed polar bears becoming sick
118. See Sierra Club, 430 F.3d at 1345.
119. Areas such as New Orleans attract a large amount of tourism. A search of tourist
web sites will show that there are many attractions, such as steamboat tours, that are shut
down due to Hurricane Katrina. See, e.g., Trip Advisor, www.tripadvisor.com/Attractionsg60864-Activities-c25-New_Orleans_Louisiana.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
120. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 n.1 (1992).
121. Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156 (4th
Cir. 2000); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 34–35 (1998) (stating that
those with generalized grievances should pursue those claims in the political branches of the
government, not within the judiciary).
122. See Jane Kay, Polar Bears To Be Considered for Threatened Species List, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 9, 2006, at A5. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is currently studying the status of the
polar bear species in light of significant climate changes in the Arctic in order to determine if it
should list the polar bear as an endangered species. Id. If such a declaration is made, “it would
be the first mammal deemed in danger of extinction because of global warming.” Id.
123. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 432–33 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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and dying from the dangerous conditions caused by global warming,
she could claim that she had suffered “in a personal and individual
way.”124
Some may misconstrue the courts’ refusal to adjudicate a
generalized grievance to mean that only the plaintiff can suffer the
injury to the exclusion of the general public.125 However, if that were
the case, the widespread or global nature of global warming would
largely bar plaintiffs’ claims.
Even if it is “widely shared” by many other people, a plaintiff’s
claim of injury may still be justiciable to the extent that the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the defendant’s emissions affected her in a
personal and individual way.126 Continuing with the polar bear
example mentioned above, the Alaskan resident could plausibly be
joined by thousands of other residents who claim a similar injury to
their aesthetic interest in polar bears. Nonetheless, the widespread
nature of the injury in the Arctic would be irrelevant as long as the
plaintiff could prove that the adverse conditions caused by the
defendant’s actions injured her in a personal, individual way.127
The plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA failed to grasp the
importance of particularizing the allegations to themselves rather
than simply to the public at large.128 The plaintiffs wanted the court
to require the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions under the

124. See id.
125. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 34–35; Am. Canoe Ass’n v. La. Water & Sewer Comm’n,
389 F.3d 536, 544–45 (6th Cir. 2004); Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg’l Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247,
254 (1st Cir. 2003); Apache Bend Apartments v. United States, 987 F.2d 1174, 1176 (5th
Cir. 1993); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Miller, 992 F.2d 1548, 1548 (11th Cir. 1993); Nat’l Fed’n of
Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 883 F.2d 1038, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
126. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals credits the Supreme
Court’s decision in Federal Election Commission v. Akins for reversing the tide of precedent
from stressing the “widespread (or generalized) nature of an injury” to the concrete,
particularized nature of the injury. See Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 651–52
(9th Cir. 2004). This requirement that a plaintiff not bring a claim amounting to a generalized
grievance is actually a prudential limitation on standing. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). Although the analysis of this limitation may be appropriately
placed in the prudential standing analysis, courts treat this limitation in conjunction with the
injury-in-fact analysis of constitutional standing. It seems as though courts have more or less
imported this prudential limitation into the injury-in-fact analysis. In Akins, the Supreme
Court appears to accept that the generalized grievance limitation can be “styled as a
constitutional or prudential limitation on standing.” 524 U.S. at 23.
127. See generally Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding plaintiff’s
action against USDA to ban the use of “downed livestock” for human consumption).
128. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 59–60 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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Clean Air Act,129 but the court did not rule in favor of the plaintiffs.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Sentelle concluded that the
plaintiffs’ global warming claims amounted to an allegation that
global warming was “harmful to humanity at large.”130 Even
assuming that global warming is harmful to the general public, such
a claim fails because it amounts to a generalized grievance on behalf
of the public’s common welfare. It fails to constitute a particularized
harm and fails to meet the standards recognized in Lujan and
Laidlaw.131 Thus, if plaintiffs carefully articulate their injuries from
global warming as affecting them personally, it will be immaterial
“that legions of other persons” along the Gulf Coast or in the Arctic
are similarly injured.132
3. Actual injury and imminent injury
After the plaintiff has established that the nature of her injury is
fit for adjudication—that it is concrete and particularized—she must
still prove that her injury falls within the appropriate time frame,
meaning that it has already occurred or will occur in the imminent
future. Whether the injury is one that the plaintiff has already
sustained from a defendant’s emissions (actual injury), or whether
the injury is one that she will soon sustain from such emissions

129. Id. at 56.
130. Id. at 60.
131. Id. at 59–60.
132. Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 469 (4th Cir. 2001). One way that may
significantly enhance the success of lawsuits seeking redress for global warming injuries is to
have the state act as plaintiff. It may not be easy to show that a company’s emissions caused a
specific hurricane, which then destroyed a particular house, or to show that a company caused
the sea level to rise in a certain area, which then damaged the terrain of a particular piece of
property. In these circumstances, one could attribute these damages to factors other than
global warming. David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort–Based
Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 24–25 (2003). However, if the
plaintiff is the state complaining of damaged roads or a lengthy, retreating shoreline, then it is
easier to show that these damages are tied to global warming. Id. Another reason why having
the state act as plaintiff may be effective is that individual plaintiffs lack the resources to litigate
successfully against big oil and power companies with deep pockets. The advantage of having
the state serve as plaintiff was illustrated in the tobacco litigation in the 1990s. Until the mid1990s, individual plaintiffs had won two out of some eight-hundred private actions against the
tobacco companies. See Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Public
Policy, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 190 (2000). One of the crucial factors to the turn-around of
the litigation against the tobacco companies was the involvement of attorneys general in
pursuing state reimbursement claims for Medicaid and other health care expenditures, resulting
in the tobacco companies incurring a long-term obligation of $240 billion. Id. at 191–92.
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(imminent injury), is inconsequential.133 Plaintiffs will fail to prove an
actual injury or imminent injury because they cannot prove that the
ultimate consequence of the defendant’s emissions—global
warming—caused or will cause their injury. This Part examines the
inability of courts to hold that a plaintiff has demonstrated an injuryin-fact as a result of the lack of science and the lack of law to sustain
such a holding. The analysis that follows regarding the inability of
courts to make such a holding applies to actual injury and imminent
injury.
It is important not to confuse causation analysis with this part of
injury-in-fact analysis. Some may construe the analysis as involving
two different causation inquiries: first, whether global warming itself,
the by-product of carbon emissions, caused or will cause the injuries
alleged by the plaintiff; and second, whether the defendant’s
emissions provided the necessary impetus to global warming to
create the natural disaster that caused the plaintiff’s alleged injuries.
However, courts have narrowed the causation analysis to whether the
injury can ultimately be traced to the actions of the specific
defendant, as opposed to an independent third party. But before a
court can determine if it was specifically the emissions of the named
defendant that caused the injury, the court must first determine
whether global warming in general, the result of carbon dioxide
emissions that ultimately causes the natural event, is likely to have
caused, or will imminently cause the alleged injury; the inquiry here
concerns the likelihood that the defendant’s actions can cause the
harm.134 If global warming is not the cause of hurricanes, floods,
rising sea levels, or other natural events, then it is irrelevant that the
defendant’s emissions may contribute to global warming. This initial
inquiry falls under the injury-in-fact analysis.135
This initial analysis is challenging for the court because there are,
in reality, only a few certainties with respect to global warming: (1)
the earth’s mean temperature has risen by a little less than one
degree Celsius over the last century; (2) the level of atmospheric
carbon dioxide has increased over the last two centuries; and (3)

133. Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 556 (5th Cir.
1996).
134. See Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 451 (10th Cir. 1996).
135. Id.
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carbon dioxide has contributed to this warming.136 Part III
established that beyond these facts, there is much uncertainty
concerning the effects of global warming. A plaintiff whose house
was destroyed by a hurricane cannot yet prove that global warming
caused the hurricane. A plaintiff whose trees were damaged by spruce
bark beetles cannot conclusively demonstrate that global warming
caused an outbreak of the insect.137 Therefore, science does not yet
provide the necessary consensus upon which a court can make a
determination that the defendant’s emissions, which contribute to
the earth’s warmer temperatures, are likely to contribute to the
alleged actual or imminent injury.
The inability and inappropriateness of courts holding that global
warming was the cause of a natural disaster is reflected by the failure
of legislators to make such a determination. Pursuant to the
enactment of major environmental statutes such as the Clean Water
Act and the Clean Air Act, congressional committees and federal
agencies with expertise in the regulated area have performed a
tremendous amount of research and evaluation to determine that
certain pollutants, if present above certain thresholds, are toxic and
harmful. For example, in Covington v. Jefferson County, in which a
municipal landfill emitted CFCs and other ozone-depleting
substances into the atmosphere, the court could rely on the
acceptable limits for such emissions established by the Clean Air Act
to objectively decide that the landfill’s actions were injurious.138
Judge Gould’s concurring opinion relied on the “conclusive” science
that the release of CFCs destroys stratospheric ozone, diminishing
that layer of protection that humans have from radiation.139 It was
this conclusive evidence regarding the dangers of CFCs that led
136. Mark LaRochelle & Peter Spencer, “Global Warming” Science: Fact vs. Fiction,
CONSUMERS’ RES. MAG., July 2001, at 5; see also Patrick J. Michaels, Global Warming Is a
Threat? It Just Ain’t So!, FREEMAN, Oct. 2005, at 6.
137. Jim Robbins, Beetles Taking a Devastating Toll on Western Forests, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 2004, at F4. Some scientists are attributing an increase in the spruce bark beetle
population to warmer temperatures. Id. In Alaska, this insect has destroyed almost four million
acres of white spruce trees. Id. In 2004, the beetle killed almost 600,000 acres of pine. Id.
138. See generally Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 626 (9th Cir.
2004). Chlorofluorocarbons, or CFCs, are the byproduct of human activity that are chiefly
responsible for the depletion of the earth’s ozone layer. Jennifer Woodward, Comment,
Turning Down the Heat: What United States Laws Can Do To Help Ease Global Warming, 39
AM. U. L. REV. 203, 210–11 (1989). The depletion of the ozone layer facilitates the warming
of the earth. Id.
139. Covington, 358 F.3d at 650.
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Congress to regulate CFCs, and courts should defer to that
judgment.140
However, in the context of greenhouse gas emissions, plaintiffs
do not have this type of objective consensus from this country’s
legislators. The lack of political consensus poses problems because it
results in a lack of legal standards and regulations that can guide a
court in deciding whether a defendant’s emissions caused, or will
cause, an injury. In most environmental cases, a court looks to a
statute like the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act and can then issue
a holding that the defendant’s discharge of emissions of a particular
pollutant was clearly harmful. In the context of greenhouse gases,
courts have no law to rely on to make such determinations.
The federal government under the Bush administration has not
imposed mandatory limits on carbon dioxide.141 In Massachusetts v.

140. Id. In Covington, the county constructed a waste landfill directly across the street
from a couple’s home. Id. at 633. Several inspections revealed that that the landfill was being
improperly maintained. Id. at 634. The couple filed an action under the RCRA and CAA
against the county and inspecting entity, and the court held that the plaintiffs had standing
under both statutes. Id. In an article by Bradford Mank, he applied the reasoning of the court
in Covington, particularly that of the concurring opinion, to argue that certain plaintiffs should
have standing to file global warming suits. Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming:
Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 63–64 (2005). However, the facts of Covington
are distinguishable from those in a global warming suit. In Covington, the plaintiffs were right
across the street from a landfill. 358 F.3d at 638. They were “directly confronted with risks”
by the landfill’s violations of the RCRA, such as fires, scavengers, and groundwater
contamination. Id. at 639. In terms of causation, there was no doubt that the county’s failure
to properly maintain a waste landfill just across the street from the plaintiffs caused
“‘reasonable concern’ of injury” to the plaintiffs. Id. In its passage of the RCRA, Congress
agreed that the improper handling of hazardous waste may indeed cause reasonable concern of
injury to another. The alleged harm under the CAA was a result of the release of CFCs. Id. at
640. Unlike greenhouse gases and like carbon dioxide, there has been sufficient consensus on
the dangers of CFCs and other ozone depleting substances. In 1990, Congress enacted a new
version of the CAA, which placed “stringent guidelines that mandate the phase-out of all
ozone-depleting substances.” Nancy D. Adams, Title VI of the 1990 Clean Air Act and State
and Local Initiatives To Reverse the Stratospheric Ozone Crisis: An Analysis of Preemption, 19
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 173, 191 (1991). The problem is that the science is not conclusive
with respect to global warming, and there is no judgment of Congress on global warming to
which a federal court can defer. See infra Part IV.B. This Comment does not agree with
Mank’s conclusion that the reasoning in Covington is persuasive in the context of global
warming suits. One of the other primary issues that this Comment has with Mank’s article is
his acceptance of the growing evidence of global warming and its negative consequences. This
Comment, for reasons discussed in Part III, does not agree that the science is adequately
conclusive to warrant a court’s determination of causation between greenhouse gas emissions
and certain natural events.
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EPA, the court determined that the EPA has solid policy reasons not
to impose mandatory limits on carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons.142 Although this fact may terminate a
plaintiff’s chances of succeeding under the Clean Air Act, a plaintiff
can still make a claim under public nuisance. Alternatively, a plaintiff
may creatively argue that the claim falls within the scope of another
statute. In conclusion, regardless of whether a plaintiff is alleging an
actual or imminent injury, the courts simply lack the scientific and
legal foundation that would allow them to determine that a
defendant’s carbon emissions, and ultimately global warming, caused
or will cause a hurricane, flood, or some other natural disaster.
In reality, this initial inquiry is contingent on what side the court
takes on the global warming issue. In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Watson, the district court accepted the evidence at face value as
proving the adverse consequences of global warming.143 On the
other hand, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals vocalized its position that the science is not conclusive
regarding the harm posed by global warming.144 Nonetheless, to
proceed, this analysis assumes that a court accepts the science
supporting the harmful effects of global warming. In this case, the
plaintiff must appropriately articulate her injury as one that has
already occurred. This showing is fairly straightforward and needs
little explanation. A resident of Oklahoma, for example, may allege
that the forest fires that took his home and ravaged over 200,000
acres of the state by the end of 2005 were a product of global
warming.145 Farmers could allege that hotter temperatures in 2005,
which caused them a shortfall in their grain production, were a
product of global warming.146
141. Juliet Eilperin, 3 States Seek Emissions Pact; Western Officials To Use Northeastern
Agreement as Model, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2005, at A2; see, e.g., Global Climate Protection
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1102–03, 101 Stat. 1331.
142. 415 F.3d 50, 57–59 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Juliet Eilperin, Court Backs EPA on
Lack of Greenhouse Gas Limits, WASH. POST, July 16, 2005, at A9.
143. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02–4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).
144. 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
145. Bryan Bender, Rough Weather Plagues Points West, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan 3, 2006, at
A2. In response to a rash of forest fires off the coast of Florida in 1998, President Bill Clinton
linked global warming to the fires and warned that “[w]e’re going to have more things like this
happen.” For the Record, NAT’L REV., Aug. 3, 1998.
146. Editorial, Coal’s Global Toll, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 27, 2004, at A16; see
GELBSPAN, supra note 80, at 147–48.
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4. Imminent injury
Where the plaintiff alleges a future injury, he will not only fail for
the reasons discussed in the previous section, but he will also fail
because he will be unable to establish the imminence of the injury.
Courts want to be sure that a plaintiff is alleging an injury that is
likely to occur.147 Courts refuse to adjudicate injury claims that are
merely “an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.”148 For
this reason, courts have placed a restraint on the time frame in which
the alleged injury must occur—the “imminent” future.149 In Lujan,
the Supreme Court provided a little more substance to this restraint
by describing it to mean “certainly impending.”150
The global warming plaintiff will not be able to prove imminent
injury because any injury alleged to occur in the future as a
consequence of global warming is a matter of probability. The D.C.
147. Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, No. 90-35796, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
9031, at *27 (9th Cir. May 6, 1992).
148. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 688 (1973).
149. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Where a federal
court attempts to adjudicate an issue that does not constitute a case or controversy, it may
render an advisory opinion. See Phillip M. Kannan, Advisory Opinions by Federal Courts, 32 U.
RICH. L. REV. 769, 771 (1998). Where a plaintiff simply asserts “generalized assertions that
they will be ‘adversely affected’” by the defendant’s actions, such that the court is “left to
speculate as to the nature of the claim” that the plaintiff is making and is left with nothing
more than a hypothetical claim and “abstraction,” the court’s ruling would be nothing more
than an advisory opinion. Nat’l Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 122 F.3d 878, 883–
84 (10th Cir. 1997). If global warming plaintiffs meet the requirements of constitutional
standing, they will bring a concrete, actual claim that is fit for adjudication that will not result
in an advisory opinion. On this particular element of the analysis, however, if the court does
not restrict the parties to alleging an injury that “is at least imminent,” then the court may
likely engage in unconstitutional conduct by rendering an advisory opinion, “deciding a case in
which no injury would have occurred at all.” Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2). Thus, the “imminent” nature of a
claim does not necessarily lead a court to render an advisory opinion, but only when that claim
falls in to the category of speculation. The inadequacy of the science and models prevent global
warming plaintiffs from keeping their injury claim out of the hypothetical and speculative
classification.
150. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2.
Although “imminence” is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be
stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too
speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is “certainly impending.” It has
been stretched beyond the breaking point when . . . the plaintiff alleges only an
injury at some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make the injury
happen are at least partly within the plaintiff’s own control.
Id.
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Circuit Court of Appeals recently recognized a distinction between
injuries that “fit easily within or without the common definition” of
“imminent” and those that do not.151 The Court concluded that
“among those that fit least well are purely probabilistic injuries.”152
Global warming injuries epitomize “probabilistic injuries.” It is true
that the Supreme Court has recognized that “threatened injuries can
give rise to standing,”153 however, “‘well-established’ precedent
requires that the injury alleged be ‘substantially probable.’”154 The
Supreme Court has ratified this standard of “substantial
probability”155 and has spoken of requiring the plaintiff to
“demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a
result” of the defendant’s action.156 The entire purpose underlying
Lujan’s requirement of showing an imminent injury was to ensure
that the claim was “not too speculative for Article III purposes.”157
Global warming plaintiffs cannot take their imminent injury
claims out of the speculative category, because their claims are based
entirely on conjectural, complex systems of climate modeling.
Models and various other methods of predicting future atmospheric
conditions are central to determining whether a certain event will be
produced by global warming.
But how sure can climate scientists be about the projections
produced by their models? In a recent paper by an anthropologist
who studied several years at the National Center for Atmospheric
Research, she admitted that even climate modelers may be uncertain

151. Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. EPA, No. 04-1438, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5701, at *15
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
154. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5701, at *15 (quoting Fla.
Audubon Soc’y, 94 F.3d at 663).
155. Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975)).
156. Id. (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 422 U.S. 289, 298
(1979)). In Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., the Fourth Circuit held that
the threat of injury alone posed by the defendant’s discharges was sufficient to satisfy standing:
“The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that threatened rather than actual injury can
satisfy Article III standing requirements.” 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000); see also
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232–36 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(finding that an increased risk of wildfire from certain logging practices constitutes injury-infact).
157. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992).
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about their findings.158 She actually quoted one climate modeler as
stating, “It is easy to get caught up in it; you start to believe that
what happens in your model must be what happens in the real world.
And often that is not true.”159 Some scientists argue that the
standard climate models upon which plaintiffs’ claims would be
based assume that carbon dioxide concentration follows a perfectly
linear growth rate of one percent per year, yet studies show the
actual growth rate over the last fifteen years to be about 0.58
percent.160 The use of such an exaggerated figure demonstrates that
the models may ignore reality and “run way too fast, predicting
warming coming almost twice as fast . . . or predicting much more
warming in a given time.”161 Even some members of Congress are
questioning notable data that concludes that there has been a sharp
rise in the earth’s temperatures in recent years in comparison with
past ages.162 Moreover, models do not take into account the impact
of future legislative or regulatory action that may produce more
stringent requirements for efficiency standards, or scientific
breakthroughs that may facilitate emission reductions.163 Models do
not adequately account for alternative sources of energy and lower
prices in renewable energy, which will likely be substituted for fossil
fuels.164
In National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs standing because they failed to
show an imminent injury-in-fact from the increased emission of

158. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., A Global Warming Worksheet, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1,
2006, at A15.
159. Id.
160. LOMBORG, supra note 72, at 279. The computer simulations used for climate
change typically translate the impact from other greenhouse gases into carbon dioxide in order
to simplify the data. If one were to look at the actual growth of carbon dioxide alone per year,
one would see that its concentration grew by 0.43 percent per year in the 1990s. Id. Also,
some scientists claim that the prediction scenarios formulated by the IPCC contemplate a
larger reduction in sulfur dioxide than is realistic, which is important “because sulfur aerosols
cool the climate” and reduce the impact of warming. Id. at 279–80.
161. Id.
162. Antonio Regalado, Academy to Referee Climate-Change Fight, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,
2006, at B4. The notable research is a chart called the “hockey stick.” Id. Congress has asked
the National Academy of Sciences to assess the accuracy of the representations of the chart. Id.
163. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REP. ch. 5, at 79–80 (May 2002),
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5B
NQ76/$File/ch5.pdf.
164. LOMBORG, supra note 72, at 286.
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ozone-depleting substances.165 Similar to what plaintiffs will have to
do in global warming cases, the plaintiffs relied on various models
predicting the future impact of the harmful emissions on human
health and the environment.166 The court refused to give credence to
these models, noting some of the same flaws that exist in the global
warming models. For example, the models were based on figures of
the United States alone and failed to take into account global
contributions to the alleged injuries, the models predicted health
outcomes over a 145-year period, and the models assumed a
perfectly linear relationship between the harmful substance and the
adverse health effects.167 These modeling flaws are the same flaws
that exist in global warming models, and in this case, the court
concluded that such flaws prevented it from holding that the alleged
adverse effects were imminent.
The science and the models fail to provide the adequate level of
certainty that a defendant’s emissions will injure a plaintiff in the
imminent future. If the plaintiffs’ allegations are to be construed as
meaning nothing more than they will suffer injury “‘in this
lifetime,’” a granting of standing will be an abuse of the “elastic
concept” of imminence, stretching it “beyond its purpose,” and
leading courts to render nothing more than “an advisory opinion in
‘a case in which no injury w[ill] . . . occur[] at all.’”168
In sum, global warming plaintiffs will not succeed in proving
injury-in-fact. Whether they allege an actual or imminent injury, they
cannot show that global warming, the result of the defendant’s
emissions, resulted in the natural event causing their alleged injury.
Moreover, if plaintiffs allege a future injury, they will face an
additional obstacle of proving that their injury will occur in the
imminent future, a standard that they will not be able to meet due to
the conjectural, uncertain nature of the climate modeling and
science.

165.
166.
167.
168.
omitted).
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B. Causation

Although the Court in Lujan and Laidlaw did not analyze
causation for purposes of its holding, the Court made it clear that a
plaintiff is required to demonstrate that his concrete, particularized
injury, whether actual or imminent, is fairly traceable to the acts of
the defendant.169 Causation demands a link between the plaintiff’s
injury and the defendant’s allegedly harmful conduct170—its
greenhouse gas emissions. Global warming plaintiffs will fail to prove
causation because the causal chain between their injuries and the
emissions of a particular defendant is too attenuated by the multiple
alternative factors that could be the source of the global warming. 171
As a result, they will not be able to satisfy the necessary legal
standard of certainty, which requires the plaintiff to prove with a
“substantial likelihood” that her injury resulted from the defendant’s
carbon emissions and not some independent factor.172 In other
words, the plaintiff must show there is a substantial likelihood that if
a particular entity’s carbon emissions were reduced, or even
eliminated entirely, their injury would not have occurred.173
The ultimate problem in global warming suits is that “[t]he
climate is a vast, complex and poorly understood system.”174 The
causal chain begins with the defendant emitting greenhouse gases,
but “there is considerable uncertainty in current understanding of
how the climate system reacts . . . to emissions of greenhouse
gases.”175 Tremendous uncertainty remains with respect to the role
of natural variability in comparison to human influence in global
warming.176 There are multiple natural and artificial factors that
could be the ultimate cause of the global warming that produced the
natural disaster. These factors may act as supervening factors in the

169. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
170. Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 161 (4th
Cir. 2000).
171. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 41–42 (1976)).
172. Pub. Interest Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64,
72 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 68.
174. Jenkins, supra note 158, at A15.
175. LaRochelle & Spencer, supra note 136, at 5.
176. Id.
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chain of causation.177 It is possible that the defendant’s emissions
contributed to warmer temperatures, but it is also possible that the
effects of farming on the environment were a more substantial factor
in producing the necessary atmospheric conditions that produced the
injury.178 It is possible that the defendant’s emissions influenced
temperatures, but it is also feasible that the impact of a city’s
pavement and buildings was the significant factor in producing the
necessary temperature rise.179 It is possible that solar activity was the
cause of the warmer temperatures.180 It is plausible that warmer
temperatures were not a product of an increase in carbon dioxide,
but rather a product of water vapor—“water vapor is a far more
powerful
greenhouse
gas
than
carbon
dioxide.”181
Chlorofluorocarbons and other greenhouse gases, such as methane,
may contribute to global warming.182 In fact, CFCs “trap over ten
thousand . . . times more thermal radiation than does carbon
dioxide.”183 Even if carbon dioxide emissions were the source of the
hurricane or forest fire, the source of those emissions may not have

177. This Comment disagrees with a law review piece authored by David Grossman.
Grossman argues that “the studies and models of the IPCC relied upon provide a solid basis
for arguing that a general causal link exists between greenhouse gas emissions, climate change,
and effects such as sea-level rise, thawing permafrost, and melting sea ice.” David A. Grossman,
Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort–Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 22–23. According to Grossman, the causal chain is not too attenuated to show
causation and to show that the companies that produce greenhouse gases do not lack control
of the means by which these gases are produced. Id. at 27. This author agrees that Grossman’s
argument could hold up if science could conclusively prove that global warming actually
caused floods, sea-level rise, or other natural calamities. However, this author does not believe
that current science can support such a conclusion. For more discussion of the inadequacies of
science in this area, see supra Part III.
178. See Sallie Baliunas, Full of Hot Air: A Climate Alarmist Takes on “Criminals Against
Humanity,” REASON, Oct. 2005, at 64.
179. Id.
180. See LOMBORG, supra note 72, at 276. “[S]olar brightness has increased about 0.4
percent over the past 200–300 years, causing an increase of about 0.4°C . . . and the trend
over the last decades is equivalent to another 0.4°C to 2100.” Id.
181. Guterl, supra note 95, at 44 (quoting Richard Lindzen). Lindzen claims that a
slight change in the amount of water vapor in the atmosphere “could wipe out, or amplify, the
effects of a rise in carbon dioxide.” Id.
182. Lauren Etter, Editorial, Global Warming: A Cloudy Outlook, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10,
2005, at A10. The United States’ one hundred million cattle emit 5.5 million metric tons of
methane a year, accounting for almost twenty percent of human-related methane emissions. Id.
183. Woodward, supra note 138, at 211.
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been industrial. In 2003, more carbon dioxide was emitted by
transportation sources than by industrial sources.184
The science does not permit a court to conclude that a particular
defendant’s carbon emissions were the cause of a global warming
plaintiff’s injury. History provides poignant examples of people
attributing the effect to the wrong cause.185 The hurricane or flood
that produced the plaintiff’s injury could be the effect of many
different sources, one of which may be the defendant’s carbon
emissions. But the court certainly cannot conclude that there is a
substantial likelihood or a good probability that those emissions were
the definitive cause of the environmental disaster. Such a claim is not
“ripe for adjudication” because it is “contingent on a number of
factors” and is “too speculative.”186
In some environmental pollution cases, especially Clean Water
Act cases, courts will treat the plaintiff located in the emission “zone
of a polluter” differently from the plaintiff who is so far removed
from the polluter that her “injuries cannot fairly be traced to that”
polluter.187 Such a requirement of geographic proximity is consistent
with the finding of the Court in Lujan, which rejected the nexus
theories188 and denied the contention that distance does not prevent
an injury.189 This requirement would seem to argue against the
success of global warming plaintiffs in proving causation because the
individual may bring a suit against a defendant’s contribution to
global warming, the source of which is located thousands of miles
away. For example, one of the plaintiffs in Watson alleged that the
defendant’s greenhouse emissions caused an outbreak of the spruce
184. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, U.S. EMISSIONS INVENTORY 2005 (EPA 430-R-5-003)
(April 2005), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/
ResourceCenterPublicationsGHGEmissionsUSEmissionsInventory2005.html.
Industrial
sources accounted for twenty-eight percent of carbon dioxide produced from fossil fuel
combustion in 2003, but transportation sources produced thirty-two percent. Id. The
remainder of carbon dioxide emissions was a result of commercial and residential sources. Id.
185. David Doniger, Global Warming, Emissions and Kyoto, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2006,
at A15. The author of the article gives several examples of attributing a natural phenomenon to
the wrong cause: the nature of electric current to fluid flow, the cause of malaria to bad air, the
Black Death to alignment of the planets, and cancer to a virus. Id.
186. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300–01 (1998).
187. Tex. Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 973 (7th
Cir. 2004) (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149,
162 (4th Cir. 2000)).
188. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
189. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 584 U.S. 555, 567 n.3 (1992).
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bark beetle, which had destroyed forests in her home of
Anchorage.190 The problem is that the projects that she claimed were
contributing to the beetle outbreak were in, among other places,
Chad, Venezuela, and Indonesia.191
The zone of the polluter test, however, seems to be inapplicable
in global warming suits. Where the polluter is discharging a toxin
into a river, only those people within a reasonable range of the
original discharge point will be affected by the discharge. A person in
New Mexico will not be affected by a discharge of mercury into a
river in Georgia. However, it is reasonable to say that a project that
emits substantial amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere in
Venezuela contributes to the overall warming of the earth’s
atmosphere, which may affect a person living in California. In other
words, it is arguable that the zone of the polluter of greenhouse
gases is global. Moreover, a plaintiff does not need to show that the
defendant’s carbon dioxide emissions alone caused the harm.192
While a lack of geographic proximity will not likely impede
plaintiffs from filing actions for carbon emissions in distant locations,
the science is still not sufficiently determinative to allow courts to
decide that it was the actions of a particular party rather than those
of an independent third party that are the cause of plaintiffs’ injuries.
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court intended the causation
factor to be a rigorous scientific examination, but at the bare
minimum, in order to bring suit, the plaintiff must establish that he
is “adversely affected” by the defendant’s action.193 Presently, the
science is such that a plaintiff cannot demonstrate a “substantial
likelihood” that a factory’s carbon emissions, a routine consequence
of industrial operations, are adversely affecting (or will adversely
affect) a plaintiff’s concrete, particularized interest. No regulation or

190. Declaration of Melanie Duchin at 2, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C
02–4106 (JSW), 2005 WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).
191. Watson, 2005 WL 2035596, at *2; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief (Second Amended) at 39–45, Watson, 2005 WL 2035596, available at
http://www.climatelawsuit.org/documents/Complaint_2Amended_Declr_Inj_Relief.pdf.
192. Pub. Interest Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64,
72 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 162.
193. Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 162. Assuming that a court did determine that plaintiffs
had shown that the defendant’s emissions were a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, it would have
an additional burden of establishing how to allocate liability of the multiple sources of the
injury. This question of liability is not part of standing analysis and is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
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legislation has been enacted that allows one to objectively qualify a
company’s carbon emissions as harmful, wrongful, or negligent, and
there are too many factors in the causal chain to trace the harm back
to the defendant’s carbon emissions.
C. Redressability
Lujan and Laidlaw both included redressability as an essential
component of the standing analysis. This requirement consists of
determining whether a favorable decision by a court would likely
redress the plaintiffs’ injuries.194 Even if a plaintiff proves to the court
that the defendant caused or will cause her injury, the court will not
expend its resources in adjudicating her claim unless the court can
deliver a judgment that would personally benefit her “in a tangible
way.”195 Global warming plaintiffs generally will have no problem
showing redressability.
With respect to redressability, this Section assumes that a court
has accepted that the injury-in-fact and causation prongs of analysis
have been satisfied. Certainly, if a court followed the arguments
already proposed by this Comment and refused to find the science
sufficiently conclusive as to make a finding of injury-in-fact or
causation, then redressability would be a moot issue. Assuming this
fact, the plaintiff need only show that it is “likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.”196 For example, legal damages would likely redress New
Orleans residents who lost their homes, cars, and businesses in
Katrina, providing them the value of what they had lost. An
injunction would likely redress a New Orleans resident who is
alleging that a company’s emissions pose a threat of another
hurricane. The injunction would terminate, or at least reduce, the
defendant’s emissions, diminishing future contributions to global
warming and to the possibility of a future hurricane. This would be
especially true in the case of a suit against a number of companies
whose emissions comprise a substantial portion of an industry’s
emissions. At the bare minimum, an injunction would likely
194. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
195. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975). A plaintiff must show that “the
practical consequence” of a favorable decision would result in “a significant increase in the
likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.” Utah
v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 464 (2002).
196. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
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“materially reduce their reasonable concerns about those
endangerments” caused by the company’s greenhouse gas
emissions.197 Civil penalties would likely bring redress as well because
the penalties would deter future harmful emissions, reducing its
likelihood of contributing to the adverse conditions that lead to the
development of a hurricane.198 According to the broad language of
Laidlaw, any “sanction that effectively abates” a particular conduct
“and prevents its recurrence provides a form of redress.”199
Injunctive or other equitable relief would likely assist in the
abatement of future greenhouse gas emissions and consequently
global warming.
D. Prudential Standing
Once the plaintiff in a global warming suit has established the
foregoing elements—injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability—he
has established constitutional standing. While this Comment has
argued that the chances of demonstrating constitutional standing
are, at best, remote, a global warming plaintiff has yet another
standing barrier to overcome before a court will hear his claim: he
must prove that he has prudential standing.200
Congress has the authority to confer standing on a party through
legislation. Congress has conferred such authority upon
environmental plaintiffs through citizen suit provisions found in
federal statutes such as the CAA and CWA. The basic idea
underlying prudential standing is that “in the exercise of ‘prudence,’
the Court may decline to grant standing to a plaintiff, but if
Congress explicitly confers standing on such a plaintiff, then the
Court’s ‘prudential’ hesitation is overcome.”201 Thus, a court
typically invokes prudential standing to determine whether a plaintiff
has the right to seek a particular claim “in the absence of a clear

197. Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 2005).
198. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 186.
199. Id. at 185–86. Justice Scalia found the Court’s treatment of redressability to be just
as “cavalier” as its treatment of injury-in-fact. Id. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He emphasized
that the purpose of “remediation” is to extend “relief specifically tailored to the plaintiff’s
injury, and not any sort of relief that has some incidental benefit to the plaintiff.” Id. at 204.
200. Joint Stock Soc’y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 175 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“Constitutional standing is a threshold issue that we should address before examining issues
of prudential standing and statutory interpretation.”).
201. Fletcher, supra note 25, at 252.
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statutory directive.”202 The Supreme Court has never clearly defined
the actual dimensions of prudential standing; however, it has
explained that this analysis encompasses several limitations.
Considering the pattern by federal courts in interpreting one of these
specific limitations as part of their prudential standing analysis, this
Comment only focuses on whether the plaintiff’s complaint falls
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.203
Additionally, it must be noted that the zone-of-interest test does not
apply to common law actions, such as nuisance. This prudential
inquiry “is an issue of statutory standing” only.204
For most courts, the “key inquiry” of prudential standing is
whether the plaintiff’s injury is “arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected” by the statute, or in the case of common law, the
zone of interests designed to be protected by a common law theory
under which the plaintiff brings her claim.205 The plaintiff must show
that her injury—an injury from global warming—is the kind of injury
that a statute or a common law theory of recovery is intended to
address.206 Prudential standing is not intended to be a rigorous
standard for global warming plaintiffs to satisfy.207 It excludes only
those interests that “are so marginally related to or inconsistent with
the purposes implicit” in a statute or the common law “that it
cannot reasonably be assumed” that the particular law or theory of
recovery was “intended to permit the suit.”208

202. Id.
203. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).
204. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 (1998). The following
statement elaborates upon the inapplicability of the zone-of-interest test with respect to
common law claims:
The zone of interests test applies only when a complainant must invoke a statute to
protect an injured interest. Common law rights, however, are legal interests that do
not require a statute for judicial protection. Complainants seeking redress for an
injury to an interest protected at common law need only adequately allege that
interest, and a court will know that a protectable interest is involved. Therefore, the
zone of interests test has no effect on the courts’ ability to protect common law
rights when applied in proper contexts.
Sanford A. Church, A Defense of the “Zone of Interests” Standing Test, 1983 DUKE L.J. 447, 461.
205. See Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n v. Pine Belt Reg’l Solid Waste, 389 F.3d 491,
499 (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)).
206. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998).
207. See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987).
208. Id.
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Given that the Clean Air Act regulates the pollution of the
earth’s atmosphere, this statute is the most likely candidate for global
warming plaintiffs to seek statutory relief for their injuries. Normally,
the plaintiff claims harm from a gas that is regulated by the CAA,
and in such a case, prudential standing is not an issue because of the
citizen suit provision authorizing the action.209 The problem in the
context of global warming suits is that the CAA does not expressly
regulate greenhouse gases, and it is not clear that Congress intended
to protect interests injured by global warming. In 2003, the EPA’s
General Counsel, Robert Fabricant, wrote a memorandum to the
EPA Administrator in which Fabricant concluded, after analyzing the
CAA and other relevant materials, that the CAA “does not authorize
regulation to address global climate change.”210 In Massachusetts v.
EPA, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the EPA
Administrator largely adopted Fabricant’s position in denying the
petition that was on appeal before the court in that case.211 The court
upheld the ruling of the EPA Administrator.212
However, if the court interprets the statute’s zone of interests
broadly and adopts a particular side of the global warming debate,
then global warming plaintiffs may be granted prudential standing. If
the court interprets this test as requiring it “to secure the benefits
of” the CAA “for the groups that Congress intended to benefit,” it
is possible that the court will grant prudential standing to the
plaintiffs.213 What are the benefits to be secured by the CAA? The
overriding purpose of the CAA is to “protect and enhance the
quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”214
If the court is partial to the science concluding that global warming
is adversely affecting the quality of the nation’s air and endangering
public welfare, a court may assume that Congress intended to permit

209. See Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 638 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
where plaintiff claimed injury from release of CFCs, there was no prudential standing issue
because Congress had authorized citizen suits for violations of the CAA).
210. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Leaf Tobacco Exporters Ass’n v. Block, 749 F.2d 1106, 1111 (4th Cir. 1984).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000).
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the plaintiff’s global warming action because the suit would
“advance, rather than hinder,” the stated objectives of the CAA.215
E. The Outcome
Plaintiffs in global warming suits will likely fail to prove that they
have legal standing to have a federal court adjudicate their injury
claims. First, they will fail to prove injury-in-fact, actual or imminent,
because the lack of scientific and legal foundation deprives courts of
the ability to conclude that global warming is the likely source of the
alleged injury. Second, the inherently speculative nature of climate
modeling will not allow plaintiffs to prove there is a substantial
probability that a future injury from global warming will occur
imminently. Third, the current uncertainty of the science and various
factors contributing to global warming preclude plaintiffs from

215. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. EPA, 374 F.3d 1363, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Another
judicially-created limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts is embodied in the political
question doctrine. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 754
(N.D. Ill. 2005). The political question doctrine is invoked where a plaintiff brings a matter
that is more appropriate for legislative rather than judicial resolution. The history of this
limitation reaches all the way back to Marbury v. Madison, in which Chief Justice Marshall
declared that questions that are political in nature are not fit for judicial determination. 5 U.S.
137, 170 (1803). The notion is that the presence of a political question should cause a court
to “refrain from adjudicating the issue to prevent unwarranted interference with decisions
properly made by the Representative Branches of the federal government.” African-American
Slave Descendants, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 755. This limitation has particular relevance to global
warming suits, which implicate issues touching upon “so many areas of national and
international policy.” Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 04 Civ. 5669(LAP), 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19964, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2005). In American Electric Power, the
plaintiffs brought a public nuisance action against the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in
the United States, alleging that they accounted for approximately one quarter of the U.S.
electric power sector’s carbon dioxide emissions. Id. at *7. The federal district judge
determined that the plaintiffs’ claims for injuries caused by the defendants’ contributions to
global warming did not fall within the “proper domain of judges” and their claims constituted
“a non-justiciable political question.” Id. at *5, *17–18. The judge highlighted a number of
actions that would be required of the court to grant the relief sought by the plaintiffs: the
court would have to determine the maximum amount of carbon dioxide that could be emitted
by the defendants, the amount by which the defendants would have to reduce their emissions,
the most effective way of implementing the reductions, the availability of alternative sources of
energy, and the effect of such changes on the United States’ negotiations with other countries
on climate change. Id. at *21–22. Considering that “virtually every sector of the U.S. economy
is either directly or indirectly a source of greenhouse gas emissions,” the court determined that
a decision on such a policy-laden matter required a “single-voiced statement” by the
government. Id. at *24–25, *27. Thus, even if global warming plaintiffs were capable of
satisfying the requirements of legal standing, a court could still refuse to adjudicate their claims
on the basis that the courtroom is not the appropriate forum for such claims to be resolved.
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showing a substantial likelihood that the defendant’s emissions can
be traced to the injury. Although redressability will not likely pose a
problem for plaintiffs, they may fail to satisfy prudential standing
where they file a claim pursuant to a federal statute. This will depend
on the particular court’s interpretation regarding the intended scope
of interests to be protected by the statute.
V. LEGAL STANDING, GLOBAL WARMING,
AND PROCEDURAL INJURY
Plaintiffs in global warming suits will fail to prove legal standing
where they allege that they have suffered a substantive injury from an
entity’s contributions to global warming; however, they may succeed
where they instead allege a procedural injury. A procedural injury
occurs where a statute mandates that certain procedures be followed
“to ensure that the environmental consequences of a project are
adequately evaluated” and where the acting agency fails to comply.216
For example, in Lujan, the subject of the action was the Endangered
Species Act, which requires agencies to follow a mandated
consultative procedure: before a federal agency finances, authorizes,
or pursues an action that may endanger a threatened species or its
habitat, that agency must first consult with the Secretary of Interior
to prevent or mitigate any such damage from occurring.217 Thus, the
statute creates a procedural right in private citizens to interagency
consultation, authorizing them to bring an action against the
government where it fails to perform the requisite consultation. 218
Part IV of this Comment reviewed the ability of plaintiffs to
prove legal standing in global warming suits where they have alleged
a substantive injury, rather than a procedural injury. A substantive
injury consists of an injury that is not tied to the consequences of a
government entity’s failure to comply with required procedures.219
For example, the plaintiff in Korsinsky v. EPA filed an action against

216. Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 1988). A procedural
right is “the right to have the Executive observe procedures mandated by law.” Hodges v.
Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 444 (4th Cir. 2002).
217. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 558 (1992).
218. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–72.
219. Randall S. Abate & Michael J. Myers, Broadening the Scope of Environmental
Standing: Procedural and Informational Injury-in-Fact After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 345, 346 (1994).
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the defendants, claiming that their carbon dioxide emissions had
caused his mental sickness and enhanced vulnerability to certain
diseases—there were no procedural requirements with which the
defendants had failed to comply.220
Although the two kinds of injury differ in their character, courts
apply the same standing analysis to both. A plaintiff’s allegation of a
procedural injury may have more success than that of a substantive
injury because of the “special” nature of a procedural injury.221 In
Lujan, Justice Scalia articulated in a footnote what has come to be
called, at least in the Ninth Circuit, “footnote seven standing.”222
Justice Scalia stated that when a plaintiff is alleging a violation of a
procedural right that a statute accords him, he “can assert that right
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy.”223 In other words, a procedural injury “relaxes” the
normal standards of standing.224
One disadvantage of seeking relief for a procedural injury is the
resulting limitation in the remedies available. If the plaintiff claims a
procedural injury, he will not be able to seek legal damages for his
own injuries. Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
for example, the standard remedy will be to vacate the agency’s
uninformed decision to conduct a project without the proper
environmental analysis and to enjoin the project until the NEPA
requirements are met.225 Plaintiffs can seek harsher penalties against
defendants for their procedural violations under substantive
environmental statutes. For example, a plaintiff could allege an injury
from the defendant’s failure to adhere to the procedural
requirements of the Clean Air Act, pursuant to which a court could
grant a broad range of civil and criminal penalties for violations of its
provisions.226
This Part evaluates what plaintiffs will have to prove in order to
satisfy the three elements of constitutional standing—injury-in-fact,
220. No. 05 Civ. 859 (NRB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21778 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 29, 2005).
221. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
222. Pac. Nw. Generating Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 1994); see
also Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 917 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995); Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v.
Babbitt, 900 F. Supp. 1349, 1361 (D. Idaho 1995).
223. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
224. See Cantrell v. Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 682 (9th Cir. 2001).
225. See Susannah T. French, Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA
Litigation, 81 CAL. L. REV. 929, 967 (1993).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2000).

457

3BERTAGNA.FIN.DOC

5/12/2006 10:51:07 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2006

causation, and redressability—and prudential standing in the context
of a procedural injury. This Part argues that the most likely avenue
for global warming plaintiffs to have a federal court hear their claims
is by alleging a procedural injury, because plaintiffs do not have the
burden of proving that a future injury is imminent and the causation
standard is relaxed. The most likely procedural statute to be invoked
by global warming plaintiffs in these suits is the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) because of its universal
requirement that a federal agency follow certain mandated
procedures before it proceeds with any project that may significantly
affect the environment.227 Under NEPA, plaintiffs are likely to allege
the “archetypal procedural injury”—an agency’s failure to prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS) before taking action with
potentially adverse environmental effects.228
A. Injury-in-Fact
This prong of the analysis is the most important part of the
plaintiff’s burden because it is the court’s “normal focus of standing
analysis” in procedural rights cases.229 Global warming plaintiffs
claiming a procedural injury are more likely to satisfy the injury-in227. The concept of a procedural injury is rooted in NEPA. See Abate & Myers, supra
note 219, at 354. NEPA is a procedural statute, meaning that it guarantees a particular
procedure, not a particular result. See Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737
(1998). It grants “relief in the form of directives to follow mandated procedures.” Abate &
Myers, supra note 219, at 356. The principal procedure of NEPA requires federal agencies to
prepare a report called a comprehensive environmental impact statement (EIS) before they
pursue any action which may “significantly affect[] the quality of the human environment.” 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000). Although plaintiffs initially brought procedural injury claims
pursuant to procedural statutes, such as NEPA, they eventually began filing procedural injury
claims under substantive environmental statutes as well. See Abate & Myers, supra note 219, at
356. Substantive environmental statutes resemble procedural statutes in that they both are
centered on environmental protection; however, substantive statutes offer more substantive
remedies, “such as monetary damages or injunctions against environmentally destructive
practices.” Id. For example, the Clean Air Act is a substantive environmental statute, which
requires, among other things, federal agencies to conduct environmental evaluations prior to
promulgating regulations under the act. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. 316 F.3d 1002,
1015 (9th Cir. 2002). If the agency fails to perform the requisite analysis, plaintiffs may file a
procedural injury claim pursuant to the CAA. Id. Essentially, as long as a statute mandates that
an agency formally conduct an evaluation of environmental impacts of a proposed action
before pursing it, a procedural harm may be asserted pursuant to the statute.
228. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Manson, 414 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
229. Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 669; see also Hodges v. Abraham, 300
F.3d 432, 444 (4th Cir. 2002); Sierra Club v. Mainella, No. 04-2012 (JDB) 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18911, at *24 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2005).
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fact prong because the relaxed standards of procedural injury remove
the requirement of proving an imminent injury. This Section first
discusses why one obstacle for plaintiffs in procedural injury cases—
proving the harm of global warming—remains an obstacle to
standing. The second half of this Section discusses how the relaxed
nature of the immediacy requirement may facilitate a grant of
standing.
Asserting a procedural injury will not aid plaintiffs with respect to
the first obstacle mentioned in Part IV regarding substantive injuries.
An important burden that plaintiffs have under the injury-in-fact
analysis is to demonstrate the likelihood of harm from the challenged
action.230 The challenged action in these cases is the carbon
emissions, but it is ultimately the result of these emissions, global
warming, that allegedly causes the injury. Thus, a part of the injuryin-fact analysis is showing that the injury or threat of injury has
occurred, or will occur, as a result of global warming.231
If plaintiffs cannot show that global warming caused the
hurricane, or will imminently cause the hurricane, they cannot satisfy
their burden of proving an actual or imminent injury. It does not
matter if the defendant’s emissions contribute to global warming if
global warming itself is not the cause of the natural event. This
Comment has already adequately developed the argument of why
plaintiffs cannot satisfy this burden—the science does not allow it.232
The nature of the claim in the procedural injury context changes in
that the plaintiff is not claiming that the injury resulted directly from
the defendant’s emissions. Rather, the claim is that the injury
resulted from the defendant’s uninformed decision making; by
allowing a project to go forward, the defendant created a threat of
imminent injury by contributing to global warming.233 However, the
plaintiff must still show that the lack of environmental analysis
resulted in “an increased risk of actual, threatened, or imminent
environmental harm.”234 The same problem exists as in the
substantive injury context: plaintiffs cannot prove that global
warming caused the hurricane or will imminently cause a hurricane.

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 451 (10th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 452; see also discussion supra Parts III, IV.A.4.
Lucero, 102 F.3d at 452.
Id.
Id. at 449.
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This Comment has highlighted that the first obstacle is largely
contingent on which position the particular court takes on the
science. The remainder of this analysis will proceed assuming that a
court accepts the science arguing that global warming is capable of
causing a hurricane or other natural disaster. Some courts,
particularly those in the Ninth Circuit, include a “geographic nexus”
test as part of their injury-in-fact analysis.235 Under this test, global
warming plaintiffs would be required to show a geographic
proximity between their location and the location that was adversely
affected by the defendant’s carbon emissions.236 For the same reason
mentioned in Part III regarding the zone of the polluter analysis, this
test poses no obstacles for global warming plaintiffs. The unique
global nature of global warming will allow a plaintiff to establish a
geographic nexus no matter the distance between her and the place
suffering injury. A plaintiff in North Carolina can prove the necessary
nexus with the defendant’s emissions in Chad because the global
warming affects the global atmosphere, which affects the sea level
near her home in North Carolina.
The principal way in which the relaxed standards of procedural
standing assist global warming plaintiffs is by allowing them to allege
an injury that will occur in the future. The court wants to assure
itself that it is not adjudicating a claim that will not come to fruition.
As a result, the court requires that the plaintiff allege an injury that is
likely to occur in the imminent future.237 This Comment has
established that because of the conjectural nature of the science and
climate modeling, it will be difficult for plaintiffs to prove that the
injury, such as a hurricane, will occur in the imminent future.238
However, if the plaintiff alleges a procedural injury, “the
requirements of immediacy of the threatened harm are relaxed.”239
Under this relaxed standard, it will not matter if they cannot show
that the greenhouse gas emissions from a project permitted to move
forward due to a failure to produce the EIS will result in imminent
injury.240 A plaintiff will probably not be able to prove that the
emissions of a project in Indonesia will cause the sea level to rise near
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

460

Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Wilderness Soc’y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
See discussion supra Part IV.A.4.
Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003).
See id.
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her house in the near future, but that consideration is irrelevant in a
procedural injury case. In Lujan’s hypothetical scenario, the Court
said that the plaintiff would have standing to sue even if the dam
would not be finished “for many years.”241 This relaxed standard is
helpful to global warming plaintiffs, who will not be able to show
whether the hurricane or the threat of a hurricane will occur in a few
months, years, decades, or longer.
Therefore, in procedural injury cases, one obstacle for plaintiffs
remains, but another is relieved. Even though plaintiffs in these
actions are claiming injury from an agency’s failure to adequately
assess the environmental consequences of a particular project or
practice, they must still show that the uninformed decision making
endangers the environment and their concrete interests. The current
state of science does not allow them to conclusively make this
showing. However, assuming a court does accept the science, the
plaintiffs will no longer be burdened by having to show that the
alleged injury will occur in the imminent future, because this
requirement is relaxed.
B. Causation
Assuming a court accepts that the plaintiffs in a procedural injury
suit have established that they will suffer a concrete, particularized
injury-in-fact from global warming, they must then prove that it was
specifically the defendant’s procedural violation that caused their
injury. However, the standard to be applied by a court will vary. The
courts have adopted two different standards in analyzing causation.
This Section evaluates the standard adopted by the D.C. Circuit and
Ninth Circuit, respectively. It argues that under the D.C. Circuit
standard, plaintiffs will have the same trouble showing causation as in
substantive injury cases because the standard is the same. Yet,
plaintiffs have a reasonable chance at proving causation under the
Ninth Circuit standard because of the relaxed nature of the analysis.
The D.C. Circuit has promulgated one standard of causation
that requires plaintiffs to show with a “substantial probability” that
the defendant’s procedural violation caused their injury.242 The

241. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
242. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Manson, 414 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005). One
court has noted that the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits follow the D.C. Circuit’s approach. See
Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 341 F.3d 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2003).
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court’s standing analysis under this approach does not change
materially from the standard it applies for causation in normal
substantive injury cases.243 The court is still going to look at the
chain of causation between the agency’s procedural omission or
deficiency and the plaintiff’s injury.244 The problem with global
warming, as this Comment has already explained, is that this causal
chain is too attenuated by the numerous alternative factors that may
cause the injury for a court to grant standing.245 The court will look
at one end of the chain and see an agency’s contributions to an
overseas project for which no EIS was prepared. The court will then
have to follow a long chain all the way to the other end to see the
plaintiff’s alleged injuries. Between one end of the chain and the
other, the court will have to consider the fate of the defendant’s
emissions once they enter the atmosphere, “the impact of those
emissions that remain in the atmosphere on the radiative properties
of the atmosphere,” the influence of solar activity, the role of clouds,
the effects of water vapor, and so on.246 Ultimately, plaintiffs cannot
show that it was the defendant’s particular project, which went
forward without the proper environmental assessment, that caused
the destructive natural event. The science implicates too many
independent factors and forces that can intervene with the chain of
causation between the injury and the defendant’s procedural failure.
For these reasons, procedural injury plaintiffs most likely will not
succeed under this standard in tracing their injury to the procedural
violation of the defendant.
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit’s substantial probability standard
of causation is the standard promulgated by the Ninth Circuit,247
under which the requirements of causation are “relaxed.”248 This
standard requires the plaintiffs to prove with a “reasonable
probability” that the defendant’s procedural violation caused their
243.
244.
245.
246.

Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
See Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1158–61 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 57 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME OF THE
KEY QUESTIONS 20 (2001)).
247. Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 974. The court noted that the Seventh
Circuit follows the Ninth Circuit’s approach. Id. The Tenth Circuit has also adopted the Ninth
Circuit’s approach. See Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 451– 52
(10th Cir. 1996).
248. Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003).
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injury.249 Under this standard, the court may find causation while
still recognizing that there were independent factors or parties that
were necessary for the alleged injury to occur.250 The lower threshold
of “reasonable probability” may be sufficient to find causation251 as
long as the alleged environmental effect (global warming) has a
“reasonably close causal relationship” to the project.252 With respect
to procedural injury, the Court in Lujan did not seem worried with
causation and redressability.253 Its primary concern was linking the
procedural omission to a separate concrete interest of the plaintiffs.254
Hence, the Ninth Circuit’s relaxed causation approach appears to be
more consistent with Justice Scalia’s language in footnote seven of
Lujan.255
Regardless of the test applied, the causal chain between the
agency’s procedural violation and the plaintiff’s injury will be
attenuated; nonetheless, a plaintiff is still more likely to succeed
under this “lower threshold of causation”256 than under the D.C.
Circuit’s more stringent standard. The morass of uncertainty created
by all the conflicting science regarding the cause of global warming
precludes a court from declaring with “substantial probability” that a
defendant’s failure to produce an EIS will lead to carbon emissions
producing the necessary impact on global warming that then causes
the destructive natural event. Nevertheless, there is concomitantly a
tremendous amount of credible evidence upon which the court
could at least conclude that there is a “reasonable probability” that
the defendant’s emissions will contribute to the alleged disaster. In
sum, if the plaintiffs are before a court that applies the relaxed
249. Bell v. Bonneville Power Admin., 340 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2003).
250. Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2002).
251. Id.
252. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004).
253. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571–72 (1992).
254. Id.
255. One reason why the Court in Lujan and courts thereafter may have been
comfortable with relaxing the requirements for standing in procedural injury cases is the
unique nature of the underlying objectives of a procedural right: “A procedural right is created,
not because it necessarily yields particular outcomes, but because it structures incentives and
creates pressures that Congress has deemed important to effective regulation.” Cass R.
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 163, 226 (1992). Broader leniency in allowing standing for procedural rights would
further the objectives of procedural rights in general to provide agencies an incentive to
effectively regulate within their respective jurisdictions.
256. Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2002).
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“reasonable probability” standard of causation, the court may hold
that they have successfully proved causation.
C. Redressability
Unlike the diverging standards for proving causation outlined
above, all federal courts relax the redressability requirement in
procedural injury cases.257 As a result, procedural injury plaintiffs will
succeed in proving redressability because courts have essentially
removed this requirement from the standing analysis. Plaintiffs need
not show that a favorable decision from the court will “fully
remed[y]” them,258 that an order by the court requiring the
defendant to perform the EIS assessing the project’s effects on global
warming will benefit them,259 or that any further analysis of the
impact of the project on global warming “would result in a different
conclusion.”260 The courts’ analysis of the third requirement of
constitutional standing in the context of procedural injury cases
seems to conclude that this requirement is nearly nonexistent. A
procedural injury plaintiff satisfies this requirement by showing that
the project’s construction or operation “could be influenced” by a
court decision requiring the defendant to evaluate the projects’
potential impact on global warming.261
D. Prudential Standing
Once the procedural injury plaintiff in a global warming suit has
established the three requirements of constitutional standing from
Lujan, she must also establish that she has prudential standing to
bring her claim.262 The nature of this requirement will be the same
for plaintiffs whether they are alleging a substantive or procedural
injury from a defendant’s contributions to global warming. The

257. See Colo. Envtl. Coalition v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1240 (10th Cir. 2004).
258. See Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 471 (4th Cir. 2001).
259. See Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1998).
260. Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003). In
footnote seven of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court wrote, “[O]ne living adjacent to
the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the
licensing agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he
cannot establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or
altered.” 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
261. Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2001).
262. See Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 2004).
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plaintiff must show that her injury falls within the “zone of interests”
that Congress intended to protect with the enactment of the
statute263 in order to show the court that she is litigating her own
rights and not those of a third party.264 This Comment has already
established that this analysis is inapplicable to common law claims.265
This Section will briefly examine the zone of interests associated
with NEPA, since this is the principal statute under which global
warming plaintiffs will probably bring their procedural injury claims.
This Section argues that procedural injury plaintiffs will satisfy
prudential standing with respect to NEPA as long as they are in part
motivated by a desire to protect the environment.266
With the enactment of NEPA, Congress intended to protect
environmental interests.267 Hence, if a plaintiff wanted to sue an
agency for funding a project in Chad that is contributing
substantially to global warming, the plaintiff would likely be
motivated in part to protect the environment. If her motivation is
purely monetary rather than environmental, most courts will hold
that her claim does not fall within NEPA’s jurisdiction.268 Courts do
not want private parties abusing NEPA by using it to further their
own personal interests and not those of the environment.269 The
263. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972); Hodges v. Abraham, 300
F.3d 432, 444 (4th Cir. 2002).
264. Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 674 (6th Cir. 2005).
265. See discussion supra Part IV.D. Moreover, the prudential standing analysis in the
procedural injury analysis is inapplicable to common law claims because the common law does
not stipulate procedural requirements.
266. The other principal statute under which global warming plaintiffs are likely to claim
procedural injury is the Clean Air Act, which does articulate that certain procedures be
followed. For example, in National Parks Conservation Association v. Manson, the plaintiffs
claimed procedural injury under the CAA due to the government’s failure to adequately
determine a proposed plant’s impact on air quality in the nearby area. 414 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir.
2005). However, this Comment has already addressed the prudential standing issues associated
with the CAA. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
267. Manson, 414 F.3d at 5. “NEPA does not authorize a private right of action,” which
means that a plaintiff can obtain judicial review of a NEPA claim only under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 630–31 (6th Cir. 1997). The APA
provides that a “person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision of
the APA “to impose a prudential standing requirement in addition to the requirements
imposed by Article III of the Constitution.” Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank &
Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488 (1998).
268. Nev. Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993).
269. Stratford v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 285 F.3d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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plaintiff may be motivated in part by economic interests, but she
must still demonstrate with a “substantial probability” that she has
nonmonetary interests that would qualify as a legally protected
interest under NEPA.270 Therefore, prudential standing will not pose
an obstacle for global warming plaintiffs in most cases.
E. Outcome
Although procedural injury plaintiffs are not guaranteed success
in establishing legal standing in global warming suits, they can be
assured that there chances of success are much better than when
asserting substantive injuries. They still have a substantial obstacle in
trying to prove that the global warming caused by the defendant’s
emissions results in their injury. However, where the court accepts
the science as sufficient, these plaintiffs are relieved of the difficulty
of proving an imminent injury. If the plaintiffs are before a court that
adopts the Ninth Circuit standard of causation, they have an
improved chance of having the court conclude that there is a
reasonable probability that the defendant’s procedural violation
caused their injury. Finally, the redressability requirement is
essentially nonexistent, and the zone-of-interest test is easily satisfied
in most cases. These factors argue that plaintiffs have a reasonable
chance, and definitely an improved chance, of success in proving
standing where they allege procedural injury.
VI. SUBSTANTIVE INJURY V. PROCEDURAL INJURY: A COMPARISON
This Comment has explained what plaintiffs must do to establish
legal standing in suits that seek relief for harm suffered by a
defendant’s contributions to global warming. This Part will provide a
hypothetical situation to illustrate the relative positions of a plaintiff,
comparing when she alleges a substantive injury to when she alleges
a procedural injury. The example will illustrate that global warming
plaintiffs will fail in proving standing where they allege a substantive
injury but have a much improved chance of doing so where they
allege a procedural injury.

270. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 417 F.3d 1272, 1287–
88 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Thus, having an economic interest does not “blight” the qualifying
interests and as long as there is a “congruence of interests,” monetary as well as environmental,
then standing may still be found. Id.
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A. The Problem

Many view the increasingly dangerous outlook for the future of
polar bears in the Arctic to be one of most recent manifestations of
global warming.271 Polar bears have adapted to living and hunting on
ice sheets;272 however, the ice of the Arctic is retreating more and
more every year, causing polar bears to swim long distances into the
ocean to find food.273 Since polar bears are more accustomed to
swimming shorter distances, they tire and drown.274
This example assumes that the plaintiff is a single female who is a
native Alaskan. She studies and works extensively with polar bears. She
files an action in federal district court against the three largest oil
companies in Alaska, alleging that their carbon dioxide emissions
account for roughly a quarter of the oil and gas sector’s carbon dioxide
emissions and approximately twelve percent of all carbon dioxide
emissions from human activities in the Untied States. She claims that
the defendants have violated the Clean Air Act and that their emissions
constitute a public nuisance. She claims the defendants’ emissions will
injure her by their adverse effect on polar bears.
B. Substantive Injury
The plaintiff can claim a substantive injury by alleging that the
defendants’ carbon emissions are threatening polar bears. Lujan
requires her to establish the three elements of constitutional
standing—injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.275 She must
first demonstrate that she will suffer a concrete injury, which she
satisfies by proving that she has a recreational and aesthetic interest
in working with and observing polar bears.276 Next, she must show
that she will sustain a particularized injury, which she satisfies by
proving that she has a distinct position from the public with respect
to polar bears based on her experience in working with them.

271. Jim Carlton, Is Global Warming Killing the Polar Bears?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14,
2005, at B1.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
276. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
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Moreover, she can allege that her studies will be impeded by the
diminished population of polar bears.277
Because her injury is one that will occur in the future, she must
show that her injury is certainly impending.278 The plaintiff’s first
problem is proving that global warming will likely cause her
threatened injury. She will fail to carry her burden here because the
science is too uncertain with respect to the risks of global warming,
with respect to the temperatures in the Arctic, and with respect to
the adverse conditions for polar bears.
The plaintiff faces an additional obstacle because she cannot show
that global warming will cause the necessary adverse conditions
endangering polar bears to be certainly impending.279 There are still
20,000 to 25,000 polar bears in the world, and the most recent study
concluded that they were not endangered.280 The plaintiff’s allegation of
the danger to polar bears will be based on a system of climate modeling
that is conjectural and does not provide the court with the necessary
foundation upon which it can conclude that there is a substantial
probability that the injury will occur in the imminent future.
Assuming the court accepts the science attributing the polar bear
threat to global warming and that the injury is imminent, the
plaintiff will still fail to show causation.281 She cannot fairly trace her
injury to the carbon emissions of the three defendants. The chain of
causation is too attenuated by the many independent factors that
could supervene in the ultimate harm to the polar bears.
The plaintiff must then show that a favorable judgment from the
court will provide them redress. The plaintiff will either ask for an
injunction, or alternatively, civil penalties. Either of these will likely
personally benefit her. The standard is not that the injunction or the
penalties will result in abating her injury but that they will likely
result in that abatement. If the companies are required to reduce
their emissions of carbon dioxide by millions of tons, given their
substantial contribution to carbon emissions, it is likely that their
impact on global warming will be diminished as well as the adverse
conditions associated with global warming. Even if it is questionable
as to whether the reduced emissions will prevent the adverse
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
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conditions from developing, such remedies will likely result in
materially reducing the plaintiff’s reasonable concerns about the
endangerment of the polar bear due to the company’s greenhouse
gas emissions.
Finally, the plaintiff must prove that she has prudential standing.
If the court interprets the CAA’s zone of interests narrowly, it may
deny her standing based on its holding that the CAA does not have
jurisdiction over injuries caused by global warming. However, the
court may also interpret the zone more broadly and hold that global
warming is a danger to the air and grant standing.
C. Procedural Injury
Instead of filing a claim for a substantive injury or in conjunction
with her substantive injury claim, the plaintiff may file a claim under
NEPA. She alleges that a federal agency funded several projects in
connection with these companies. She alleges that there was no EIS
prepared for the project, which went forward, emitting millions of
tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Here, she is alleging a
procedural injury.
She must still prove that she has constitutional standing. She is
still required to show that she will suffer a concrete, particularized
injury, which this analysis has already established that she can do
with relative ease.282 She also still faces the obstacle of proving that
global warming will likely cause the danger to the polar bears.
Assuming the court accepts the argument, the procedural nature of
her injury relieves her of having to show that her injury is imminent.
Even though the polar bears may not become endangered or extinct
for many years, she may still have standing.
If the plaintiff is in a court that has adopted the D.C. Circuit’s
causation standard, she will fail to prove causation, but if she is in a
court that has adopted the Ninth Circuit’s relaxed causation
standard, she may succeed. Under the latter standard, the court must
find a reasonable probability, rather than a substantial probability,
that the agency’s procedural omission will cause her injury.
Considering the amount of credible science linking global warming
to the warmer temperatures in the Arctic that foster the dangerous
conditions for polar bears, a court may conclude that it is reasonable

282. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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to find that the failure to produce the EIS partly caused the plaintiff’s
injury.283
The plaintiff must still show that a favorable judgment by the
court will benefit her personally.284 She will satisfy this burden
because a directive from the court telling the agency to conduct the
appropriate environmental evaluation will benefit the plaintiff. In a
NEPA claim, the claim is principally directed at the uninformed
decision making. Thus, if the court orders the environmental
evaluation to be conducted, they have provided relief in response to
her claim.
The plaintiff must still prove that she has prudential standing to
bring the claim under NEPA.285 She easily meets this requirement
because her interests in bringing the action are not monetary but are
connected to a sincere interest in the habitat and fate of the polar bear.
In sum, the plaintiff fails on her substantive injury claim and may
succeed on her procedural injury claim. In first scenario, she cannot
prove that global warming may endanger the polar bear, she cannot
prove that it will imminently endanger the polar bear, and she
cannot trace that alleged injury to the three companies’ carbon
emissions. However, in the second scenario, if the court accepts that
global warming may endanger the polar bear, she does not have to
show the danger is imminent; and if it adopts the Ninth Circuit’s
standard of causation, the relaxed analysis may lead it to find
causation. In the end, her chances are much better at having
standing on her procedural injury claim.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Thomas Gale Moore of the Hoover Institute, a conservative
think tank at Stanford University, states, “It is simply hubris to
believe that Homo sapiens can significantly affect temperatures,
rainfall, and winds . . . . Global change is inevitable—warmer is
better, richer is healthier.”286 In contrast, former Secretary of the

283.
284.
285.
286.

See discussion supra Part IV.B.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
See discussion supra Part IV.D.
GALE E. CHRISTIANSON, GREENHOUSE: THE 200-YEAR STORY OF GLOBAL
WARMING 253 (1999).
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Navy James Webb believes “we can (and do)” irreversibly alter the
environment by our actions or lack thereof.287
The search for certainty regarding the correlation of greenhouse
gases and natural events such as hurricanes, forest fires, and floods is
far from being resolved. And it is precisely this uncertainty—
uncertainty of the science underlying the causes of global warming
and uncertainty regarding the climate models’ ability to predict the
possible consequences of global warming—that will likely preclude
petitioners from establishing standing in federal courts to seek
redress for their alleged injuries from global warming.
For now, the most effective means by which plaintiffs can
establish standing for their claims is through the “more lenient
requirements” of standing for procedural injuries.288 Although the
outcome in these cases is not guaranteed, plaintiffs have a
significantly improved chance at proving standing, since the relaxed
standards for procedural injuries allow the plaintiffs to overcome
obstacles under the injury-in-fact and causation requirements that
they normally confront when alleging a substantive injury.289
Otherwise, global warming plaintiffs will likely fail to establish legal
standing in federal court until the science can provide greater
support for their claims.
Blake R. Bertagna∗

287. Id.
288. Cent. & Sw. Servs. v. EPA, 220 F.3d 698 (5th Cir. 2000).
289. See Shays v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 414 F.3d 76, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
∗ The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of, and express his gratitude
to, the following individuals for their editorial assistance: Ken Kuykendall, James Rasband, and
the BYU Law Review.
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